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This study investigates auditors’ consideration of industry-level information in their 
assessment of client-level risk. Auditing standards suggest that industry-level information is 
likely to be important in the assessment of client-level risk, but the standards provide few 
specifics about how auditors should use industry-level information in the risk assessment 
process. I argue that industry norms serve as a benchmark for evaluating the risk of the client and 
that deviations from industry norms could indicate increased audit risk. I create measures that 
capture the extent to which clients deviate from industry norms using proxies for client-level risk 
factors. In my primary tests, I investigate whether auditors respond to these measures of 
deviation from industry norms and whether these measures are associated with adverse audit 
outcomes. I find consistent evidence of a positive relation between these measures and audit fees, 
suggesting that auditors identify and respond to deviations from industry norms. I find limited 
evidence of a relation between these measures and the likelihood of misstatement, suggesting 
that auditors’ response to deviations from industry norms is generally appropriate. In subsequent 
tests, I consider whether auditors’ response to deviations from industry norms varies by auditor 
type. I find that Big Four auditors and industry specialist auditors are more responsive to 
deviations from industry norms than non-Big Four and non-specialist auditors. Consistent with 
this, I also find some evidence that deviations from industry norms for certain risk factors are 
more strongly associated with adverse outcomes for non-Big Four or non-specialist auditors 
relative to Big Four or specialist auditors. My findings should be of interest to auditors, 
regulators, and market participants because they suggest that identifying and responding to 
industry-level information when assessing client-level risk is an important component of 
effective audit risk assessment.  
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 The purpose of this study is to investigate whether auditors respond to industry-level 
information in their assessment of client-level risk and how this response affects audit 
outcomes.1 Auditing standards require auditors to consider risks of material misstatement from a 
variety of sources, including conditions in the company’s industry, when assessing risk (PCAOB 
AS 2110). Moreover, the risk assessment process requires auditors to “obtain an understanding 
of the company and its environment… to understand the events, conditions, and company 
activities that might reasonably be expected to have a significant effect on the risks of material 
misstatement. Obtaining an understanding of the company includes understanding… relevant 
industry, regulatory, and other external factors” (PCAOB AS 2110, par 7). While this suggests 
that standard setters view industry-level information as important in the assessment of client-
level risk, the standards provide auditors with little guidance about how industry-level 
information should affect the risk assessment process and what types of industry-level 
information are likely to be important.  
I propose that one way that auditors may use industry-level information is as a 
benchmark, or norm, against which to compare their clients when evaluating audit risk. In 
particular, I expect industry-level information to be important when client-level risk factors 
deviate from industry norms.2 Accordingly, I create measures that capture the extent to which 
clients deviate from industry norms using client characteristics that prior literature finds to be 
                                                 1 I use the terms risk, client-level risk, and audit risk to refer to the risk that the financial statements of an audit client are materially misstated. 2 My argument is similar to Brazel, Jones and Zimbelman (2009), who find that auditors can use the difference between financial and nonfinancial measures to help identify fraud companies. I posit that the difference between client-level and industry-level information can help auditors assess the risk of material misstatement more appropriately. 
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associated with risk (i.e., risk factors).3 I create three separate measures that allow the effect of 
these risk factors to vary according to the magnitude of the deviation from industry norms. First, 
I create a continuous measure of the magnitude of deviation from the industry median for each 
company and standardize the deviation by industry-year. Second, because I expect that the effect 
of deviation may be more evident for companies that are substantially riskier than industry 
norms, I create indicator variables set equal to one if the client is in the top tercile of my measure 
of deviation for each risk factor, and zero otherwise. Third, because I expect the effect of 
deviation to be more evident for companies that are riskier than industry norms across multiple 
risk factors, I create a count variable of the total number of top tercile indicators the client has. 
In my primary tests, I investigate whether these measures of deviation from industry 
norms are associated with audit fees and with the likelihood of misstatement. If deviations from 
industry norms indicate increased risk and auditors respond appropriately, they should affect the 
nature, timing, and extent of substantive audit procedures performed (i.e., auditors should 
increase effort).4 However, if auditors fail to respond appropriately, theory suggests that the 
likelihood of misstatement will be higher for companies that deviate from industry norms. 
                                                 3 The specific risk factors that I use to create my measures of deviation are stock returns, return volatility, financial distress estimated using Altman’s (1968) model as modified by Shumway (2001), and leverage. I multiply stock returns and Altman’s Z-Score by negative one so that increases in each risk factor represent increases in risk. It is important to note that I do not suggest that these are the only risk factors that might be relevant to auditors. As discussed in Sections II and III, I choose these risk factors because they are widely available for sample companies, are commonly used in accounting research, and allow me to develop expectations about the direction of the effect that deviation from industry norms is likely to have on audit fees and on the likelihood of misstatement. 4 Alternatively, auditors may respond to increased risk by charging a risk premium. However, because auditing standards require auditors to respond to increased risk by changing procedures, charging a risk premium alone would not be an appropriate response. My results are generally consistent with increased audit fees proxying for increased audit effort, although I cannot rule out this alternative explanation. 
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Accordingly, I follow prior auditing research and use audit fees to proxy for audit effort (e.g., 
Hogan and Wilkins 2008; Cao, Myers and Omer 2012) and I use the likelihood of misstatement 
to proxy for the appropriateness of auditors’ risk assessments. My models include controls for a 
number of client, auditor, and industry characteristics that have been shown to be associated with 
audit fees and the likelihood of misstatement.     
Results from my audit fee models indicate that audit fees are positively associated with 
deviations from industry norms, particularly for clients in the top terciles of my measures of 
deviation. I also find that audit fees are higher when clients deviate from industry norms across 
multiple risk factors. These findings suggest that auditors respond to risk reflected in deviations 
from industry norms by charging higher audit fees.  
Results from my misstatement models are weaker. I find an increased likelihood of 
misstatement for companies that are riskier than industry norms across multiple risk factors but 
not for my other measures of deviation. However, the limited evidence that deviations from 
industry norms are associated with adverse audit outcomes may indicate that auditors’ response 
to deviations from industry norms (as suggested by the audit fee results) mitigates the effect of 
these risk factors on the likelihood of misstatement.  
One approach to investigating whether auditors’ response mitigates the relation between 
the likelihood of misstatement and deviations from industry norms is to identify auditors that are 
more responsive to deviations from industry norms than other auditors and to examine whether 
this increased responsiveness is associated with a decreased likelihood of misstatement. 
Accordingly, I examine whether auditors’ response to deviations from industry norms and the 
effects of these deviations on audit outcomes vary by auditor type. Prior research finds that Big 
Four auditors (i.e., Deloitte & Touche LLP, Ernst & Young LLP, KPMG LLP, and 
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PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP) provide higher quality audits than non-Big Four auditors (e.g., 
Francis, Maydew and Sparks 1999; Lennox and Pittman 2010; and Eshleman and Guo 2014). 
Prior research also finds that industry specialist auditors provide higher quality audits than non-
specialist auditors (e.g., Craswell, Francis and Taylor 1995; Balsam, Krishnan and Yang 2003; 
and Reichelt and Wang 2010). Moreover, Big Four auditors and industry specialist auditors may 
have more exposure to companies in an industry and have access to more, or higher quality, 
industry information than other auditors. Accordingly, I posit that Big Four and industry 
specialist auditors may be more likely to identify and respond to deviations from industry norms. 
Because of this, I re-estimate my audit fee and misstatement models after including interactions 
between my measures of deviation from industry norms and indicators for auditor type.  
My results for Big Four auditors indicate that the positive association between audit fees 
and deviations from industry norms is primarily driven by Big Four auditors. The incremental 
effect of Big Four auditors is also stronger for clients in the top terciles of my measures of 
deviation from industry norms and for clients that deviate from industry norms across multiple 
risk factors.  
Consistent with my primary tests, the results from my misstatement models are weaker 
than the results from my audit fee models. However, I find some evidence of a positive relation 
between deviations from industry norms and adverse audit outcomes for companies with non-Big 
Four auditors but not for companies with Big Four auditors. Specifically, the continuous version 
of the leverage deviation measure is positively and significantly associated with the likelihood of 
misstatement for non-Big Four auditors while the interaction between Big Four and the leverage 
deviation measure is negative and significant. Moreover, the sum of the coefficients on the 
leverage deviation measure and the interaction term is not statistically different from zero. This 
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provides evidence that Big Four auditors are effectively able to mitigate the negative effects of 
deviations from industry norms on audit outcomes for certain risk factors.  
 My results for industry specialist auditors are similar. They indicate that the positive 
association between audit fees and deviations from industry norms is primarily driven by 
industry specialist auditors and is stronger for clients in the top terciles of my measures of 
deviation and for clients that deviate from industry norms across multiple risk factors.  
I also find evidence that industry specialist auditors are able to mitigate the negative 
effects of deviations from industry norms on audit outcomes. Specifically, the continuous version 
of the leverage deviation measure is positively and significantly associated with the likelihood of 
misstatement for non-specialist auditors while the interaction between industry specialist and the 
leverage deviation measure is negative and significant. As for Big Four auditors, the sum of the 
coefficients on my leverage deviation measure and the interaction term is not statistically 
different from zero, providing evidence that industry specialist auditors are also able to mitigate 
the negative effects of deviations from industry norms on audit outcomes for certain risk factors. 
In additional analyses, I investigate whether the results from the primary analyses are 
sensitive to using alternative specifications of the variables of interest and alternative 
specifications of auditor types. First, I use measures of deviation from industry norms that allow 
for differences in the relative magnitude of the deviation between industries. The primary 
analyses use measures of deviation that are standardized so that the relative distance of a 
company from the industry median is comparable between industries. Second, I use measures of 
deviation from industry norms that use the mean instead of the median as the industry 
benchmark. Overall inferences are unchanged when using these alternative measures of deviation 
from industry norms. Third, I use a large auditor indicator that combines the largest mid-tier 
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auditors with Big Four auditors. The results of these tests suggest that the increased 
responsiveness of large auditors is primarily driven by Big Four auditors. Fourth, I identify 
industry specialist auditors using the national industry market. The primary analyses identify 
industry specialist auditors using the Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) industry market. The 
results from these tests suggests that, similarly to MSA industry specialists, national industry 
specialists are more responsive to deviations from industry norms than other auditors but they 
provide little evidence that this response is associated with the likelihood of misstatement.    
 This study makes several contributions to the literature. First, to the best of my 
knowledge, this is the first study to directly investigate whether auditors consider industry-level 
information in their risk assessment. While prior literature generally includes industry indicators 
in audit fee models to control for time-invariant differences in audit fees across industries, I 
argue that client-specific deviations from industry norms are likely an important, though 
overlooked, input in auditors’ risk assessment processes and pricing decisions. Second, to the 
best of my knowledge, this is the first broad archival study to investigate whether deviations 
from industry norms affect audit outcomes. Auditing standards have long required auditors to 
consider industry factors during risk assessment, suggesting that consideration of industry 
information is important for risk assessments to be appropriate. Further, prior case studies 
provide evidence that failure to obtain and use knowledge of an audit client’s industry can 
contribute to audit failures (Erickson, Mayhew, and Felix 2000). However, prior literature does 
not provide large sample evidence about whether deviations from industry norms are typically 
indicative of increased audit risk. Third, this study contributes to the research that investigates 
the effects of auditor type on audit quality. The evidence presented here suggests that greater 
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attention to deviations from industry norms may be a mechanism contributing to the higher audit 
quality documented by prior research for Big Four and industry specialist auditors.  
My findings should be of interest to auditors, auditing standard setters, and regulators. 
The evidence presented here suggests that while auditors’ response to deviations from industry 
norms is generally appropriate, smaller, non-specialist, auditors may be able to improve their risk 
assessment processes (and audit outcomes) by focusing more carefully on deviations from 
industry norms as an indicator of increased client risk. My findings also suggest that additional 
guidance about the types of industry information that are likely to be useful and how to 
incorporate this industry information in the risk assessment process may help auditors, 
particularly smaller and non-specialist auditors, reduce the likelihood of adverse audit outcomes.    
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section II discusses relevant prior 
literature and develops the hypotheses, Section III describes variable construction, research 
design, and the sample, Section IV presents the primary analyses, Section V presents additional 
analyses, and Section VI concludes. 
II. Prior Literature and Hypotheses 
While auditors are required to consider industry-level information in their client-level 
risk assessments, the standards provide almost no guidance about the types of industry 
information that are likely to be important or how auditors should use industry information in 
their assessment of risk. I propose that one way auditors may use industry-level information is as 
a benchmark, or norm, against which to compare their clients. My argument is similar to Brazel 
et al. (2009), who investigate whether auditors can use the difference between financial and 
nonfinancial measures to help identify fraud companies. I posit that auditors can use differences 
between client-level and industry-level information to help assess audit risk. Prior case studies 
8 
provide evidence consistent with this notion. Erickson et al. (2000) examine the audit procedures 
applied to specific transactions from the Lincoln Savings and Loan (LSL) audit failure and 
conclude that “applying knowledge of LSL’s business, the real estate industry, and economic 
trends in that industry would have been the most effective audit procedures available to LSL’s 
auditors” (p. 189).5  
However, identifying appropriate company characteristics to use to measure differences 
between client-level and industry-level information is problematic because expectations about 
how these deviations are likely to affect audit risk are idiosyncratic (and consequently 
ambiguous) for many financial characteristics.6 For example, revenue is a likely candidate as an 
important financial characteristic because the auditing standards require auditors to presume that 
there is a fraud risk involving improper revenue recognition (PCAOB AS 2110, par 68). 
Accordingly, revenue growth that exceeds the industry norm by a large degree might suggest 
improper revenue recognition (which increases audit risk). Alternatively, it might indicate that 
the company is a strong performer in its industry (e.g., Apple). Similarly, return on equity or 
assets, inventory turnover, and gross margin are important characteristics in many industries, but 
in all cases, it is difficult to empirically disentangle whether exceeding the industry norm 
suggests increased risk or strong performance.  
Because of this, I choose company characteristics that prior research has found to be 
associated with general business risk and with risk related to the financial condition of a 
                                                 5 The authors examined audit workpapers and deposition transcripts related to the 1987 audit of LSL. LSL’s auditors were subsequently sued (and settled) for failing to prevent the release of materially misstated financial statements. 6 The relation between the risk factors that I use and audit risk is likely also ambiguous in some cases. However, I expect that the signal provided by these risk factors about audit risk generally runs in one direction. 
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company. The risk assessment standards explicitly acknowledge that business risk can lead to 
risk of material misstatement and require auditors to identify and respond appropriately to 
relevant business risks (PCAOB AS 2110). Specifically, the risk factors that I use are stock 
returns (Kinney and McDaniel 1989; Tan and Young 2015), return volatility (Erickson, Hanlon, 
and Maydew 2006), financial distress, and leverage (Kinney and McDaniel 1989; DeFond and 
Jimbialvo 1991; and Burns and Kedia 2006). I expect that companies with stock returns that are 
lower than industry norms, companies with return volatility that is higher than industry norms, 
and companies that are more financially constrained than industry norms are associated with 
increased audit risk.       
Following prior auditing research, I use audit fees to proxy for audit effort (e.g., Hogan 
and Wilkins 2008; Cao et al. 2012). While specific audit procedures are unobservable, prior 
studies with available audit hours, audit fees, and labor experience mix suggest that audit fees 
reflect audit effort and are associated with auditors’ response to client risk. For example, Bell, 
Landsman, and Shackelford (2001) find that auditors respond to company-level risk by 
increasing audit hours. More recently, Knechel and Schelleman (2010) find that auditors respond 
to high levels of short-term accruals by increasing audit hours of the professional staff and by 
using more supervisor, assistant, and support time. Accordingly, I interpret increased audit fees 
for companies that are relatively more risky than their industry as evidence of increased effort, 
suggesting that auditors identified and responded to risks reflected in deviations from industry 
norms. This leads to my first hypothesis (stated in the alternative):  
H1:  Companies that deviate from industry norms pay higher audit fees than other companies.  I also expect that companies that are more risky than their industry are more likely to 
misstate their financial statements than other companies, unless the auditor appropriately 
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identifies and responds to risks reflected in deviations from industry norms. I use the likelihood 
of misstatement to proxy for the appropriateness of auditors’ response because a misstatement 
indicates that the auditor issued an unqualified opinion on financial statements that were 
materially misstated (DeFond and Zhang 2014), indicating that they either failed to identify or 
failed to respond appropriately to audit risk. This leads to my second hypothesis (stated in the 
alternative): 
H2:  Companies that deviate from industry norms are more likely to misstate their financial statements than other companies.    I also investigate whether auditors’ response to deviations from industry norms varies by 
auditor type. Prior research finds that Big Four auditors provide higher quality audits than non-
Big Four auditors. For example, prior literature indicates that, relative to companies audited by 
non-Big Four auditors, companies audited by Big Four auditors have lower levels of 
discretionary accruals (Francis et al. 1999), are less likely to engage in fraudulent financial 
reporting (Lennox and Pittman 2010), and are less likely to issue financial statements that are 
subsequently restated (Eshleman and Guo 2014). Big Four auditors also have more resources 
than non-Big Four auditors and may have access to more, or higher quality, industry-level 
information. Accordingly, I posit that Big Four auditors are more likely to be responsive to 
deviations from industry norms than non-Big Four auditors and that deviations from industry 
norms are likely to be less strongly associated with the likelihood of misstatement for Big Four 
auditors than for other auditors. This leads to my third and fourth hypotheses (stated in the 
alternative): 
H3:  Companies that deviate from industry norms pay higher audit fees when they have a Big Four auditor than when they have a non-Big Four auditor.   
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H4:  Companies that deviate from industry norms are less likely to misstate their financial statements when they have a Big Four auditor than when they have a non-Big Four auditor.   Prior research also finds that industry specialist auditors provide higher quality audits 
than non-specialist auditors. For example, prior literature finds that auditors develop reputations 
as industry experts (Craswell et al. 1995), that companies with industry specialist auditors have 
lower levels of discretionary accruals and higher earnings response coefficients than other 
companies (Balsam et al. 2003), and that companies with industry specialist auditors are less 
likely to just meet or beat analysts’ earnings forecasts and are more likely to be issued a going 
concern audit opinion than other companies (Reichelt and Wang 2010). In addition, industry 
specialist auditors may be more responsive to industry-level information because industry 
specialist auditors necessarily have greater exposure to the client’s industry than non-specialist 
auditors. Intuitively, auditors specializing in an industry are also likely to be more aware of, and 
more attentive to, industry-level information than other auditors. For these reasons, my 
predictions for industry specialist auditors are similar to those for Big Four auditors, leading to 
my fifth and sixth hypotheses (stated in the alternative): 
H5:  Companies that deviate from industry norms pay higher audit fees when they have an industry specialist auditor than when they have a non-specialist auditor.  H6:  Companies that deviate from industry norms are less likely to misstate their financial statements when they have an industry specialist auditor than when they have a non-specialist auditor.  III. Variable Construction, Research Design, and Sample 
Variable Construction 
 My variables of interest capture the extent to which certain client characteristics that prior 
literature finds to be associated with risk (i.e., risk factors) deviate from industry norms. These 
risk factors are the company’s stock return, return volatility, financial distress, and leverage. I 
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choose these risk factors because they are widely available from commonly used databases, they 
are used in prior accounting literature as proxies for different aspects of company risk, and, 
importantly, because they allow me to develop expectations about the direction of the effect that 
distance from industry norms is likely to have on audit fees and on the likelihood of 
misstatement. However, I do not suggest that these are the only client characteristics or risk 
factors likely to be relevant to auditors, only that they are reasonable proxies for client risks that 
are likely to affect audit risk. 
 For each risk factor, I create three separate measures that allow the effect of the risk 
factor to vary according to the magnitude of the deviation from industry norms. First, I create a 
continuous measure of the magnitude of the standardized deviation from the industry median by 
fiscal year, as follows:7 


  jtit jtitit Varstdmedian VarmedianVarDevVar )(_ ))(( . 
Where: i indicates a company, j indicates a three-digit NAICS industry, and t indicates the fiscal 
year. I require each industry-year to have at least ten observations for calculating the industry 
median for each risk factor to help ensure that the median isn’t unduly influenced by specific 
companies and is representative of the industry as a whole.8,9 I use the three-digit level of 
                                                 7 Subtracting the industry average (whether the median or mean) is mathematically similar to including industry fixed effects in a regression model. However, including industry fixed effects alone is problematic for several reasons: The coefficients cannot be interpreted as the effect of deviation from industry norms because the variables in the regression model are demeaned across multiple dimensions (all other indicator variables included in the models), industry fixed effects don’t allow for variation over time because they use the mean for the entire sample period, and, most importantly, including the client-specific risk factors as separate control variables is necessary to ensure that my measures are capturing the effect of deviation from the industry rather than the effect of the risk factors themselves.   8 Inferences are generally unchanged if I use the industry mean instead of the median. I present and discuss analyses using the industry mean in Section V, Additional Analyses. 9 This is similar to the requirement imposed in prior literature for calculating abnormal accruals.   
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industry detail because this allows me to retain a large sample of companies while requiring ten 
observations for each industry-year.10 I use the NAICS industry classification because anecdotal 
evidence suggests that auditors have access to, and presumably use, industry reports prepared for 
NAICS industry classifications.11 I standardize the variables because the dispersion of the 
underlying risk factors varies across industries and I want the relative distance of a company 
from the industry median to be comparable between industries. I modify the typical calculation 




   n VarmedianVarVarstdmedian jtitjtit 2|)(|)(_ . 
 I create a separate deviation measure for each risk factor by replacing Var in the equation with 
the appropriate risk factor. Specifically: 
Dev Ret = Var is replaced with Ret, the company’s raw return for the year, multiplied by negative one;  Dev Vol = Var is replaced with Vol, the standard deviation of the company’s daily stock returns over the prior year;  Dev ZScore = Var is replaced with ZScore, the company’s financial distress score, multiplied by negative one (estimated using Altman’s [1968] model as modified by Shumway [2001]: ZScore = [1.2*WC/TA + 0.6*RE/TA + 10.0*EBIT/TA + 0.05*ME/TL - 0.47*S/TA]*[-1], where WC is current assets minus current liabilities, TA is total assets, RE is retained earnings, EBIT is earnings before interest and taxes, ME is the end-of-year share price times total common shares outstanding, and S is total revenue); and  
                                                 10 As an alternative, I run my tests using a five-digit NAICS classification and requiring five observations per industry-year for calculating the industry median for each risk factor (sample attrition is significant if I require ten observations per industry-year). Inferences are unchanged using this alternative classification. 11 IBISWorld, a large provider of industry reports, claims that 65 of the top 100 CPA firms subscribe to their industry reports, prepared using the NAICS industry classification. I also had the opportunity to interview an industry analyst for PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP, who indicated that they also use the NAICS classification for their in-house industry reports.  
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Dev Lev = Var is replaced with Lev, the company’s total liabilities divided by average total assets.  Ret and ZScore are multiplied by negative one in order to facilitate the interpretation of the sign 
of coefficients so that larger values of Ret indicate lower returns and larger values of ZScore 
indicate greater financial distress.  
 Second, because I expect that the effect of deviation from industry norms may be more 
evident for companies that are substantially riskier than industry norms, I create indicator 
variables set equal to one if the company is in the top tercile of the measure of deviation by fiscal 
year for each risk factor, and zero otherwise. Specifically: 
Trc Dev Ret = an indicator variable set equal to one if the company’s Dev Ret is in the top tercile of the sample distribution by fiscal year, and zero otherwise;  Trc Dev Vol = an indicator variable set equal to one if the company’s Dev Vol is in the top tercile of the sample distribution by fiscal year, and zero otherwise;  Trc Dev ZScore = an indicator variable set equal to one if the company’s Dev ZScore is in the top tercile of the sample distribution by fiscal year, and zero otherwise; and  Trc Dev Lev = an indicator variable set equal to one if the company’s Dev Lev is in the top tercile of the sample distribution by fiscal year, and zero otherwise.  Third, because I expect that the effect of deviation from industry norms may be more evident for 
companies that are riskier than industry norms across multiple risk factors, I create a count 
variable of the total number of top tercile indicators that the client has. Specifically: 
Count Trc Dev = the count of the company’s top tercile indicators (Trc Dev Ret, Trc Dev Vol, Trc Dev ZScore, and Trc Dev Lev).  
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Research Design 
To begin my investigation of auditors’ response to deviations from industry norms, I 
model audit fees as a function of my measures of deviation from industry norms and other 
determinants common to prior audit fee literature using OLS regression (e.g., Francis, Reichelt, 
and Wang 2005; Hay, Knechel, and Wong 2006; and Fung, Gul, and Krishnana 2012).12 
 Ln Feesit = β0 + β1Retit + β2Volit + β3ZScoreit + β4Levit + β5Dev Retit +    β6Dev Volit + β7Dev ZScoreit + β8Dev Levit + β9Ln ATit +    β10Ln Revit + β11Currit + β12FCFit + β13CF Volit + β14Rev Volit + β15Ln Segit + β16Foreignit + β17Lossit + β18GCOit + β19Busyit + β20BigNit + β21Mergeit + β22Mat Weakit + β23Ind Herfit +    β24Au Herfit + β25CLeadit + β26Short Tenit + βjYearFE + βjIndustryFE + εit      (1)  where, for company i and year t: Dev Ret, Dev Vol, Dev ZScore, and Dev Lev are as previously 
described. And where: 
Ln Fees = the natural log of the company’s total audit fees;  Ret = the company’s raw return for the year, multiplied by negative one;  Vol = the standard deviation of the company’s daily stock returns over the prior year;  ZScore = the company’s financial distress score, multiplied by negative one (estimated using Altman’s [1968] model as modified by Shumway [2001]: ZScore = [1.2*WC/TA + 0.6*RE/TA + 10.0*EBIT/TA + 0.05*ME/TL - 0.47*S/TA]*[-1], where WC is current assets minus current liabilities, TA is total assets, RE is retained earnings, EBIT is earnings before interest and taxes, ME is the end-of-year share price times total common shares outstanding, and S is total revenue);    Lev = the company’s leverage (total liabilities divided by average total assets);  Ln AT = the natural log of the company’s total assets ($ millions);  Ln Rev = the natural log of the company’s total revenue ($ millions); 
                                                 12 Standard errors are robust and are adjusted for clustering by company in all models (Peterson 2009). 
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 Curr = the company’s current ratio (current assets divided by current liabilities);  FCF = the company’s free cash flows (cash flows from operations less capital expenditures divided by current assets);  CF Vol = the standard deviation of the company’s net operating cash flow over the prior three years;  Rev Vol = the standard deviation of the company’s total revenue over the prior three years;  Ln Seg = the natural log of the count of the company’s business and geographic segments;  Foreign = an indicator variable set equal to one if the company reports foreign pretax income, and zero otherwise;   Loss = an indicator variable set equal to one if the company reports a net loss, and zero otherwise;  GCO = an indicator variable set equal to one if the company receives a going-concern audit opinion, and zero otherwise;  Busy = an indicator variable set equal to one if the company has a December fiscal year-end, and zero otherwise;  BigN = an indicator variable set equal to one if the company is audited by Deloitte & Touche LLP, Ernst & Young LLP, KPMG LLP, or PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP, and zero otherwise;  Merge = an indicator variable set equal to one if the company reports sales from acquisitions, and zero otherwise;  Mat Weak = an indicator variable set equal to one if the company has one or more material weaknesses in internal control identified under SOX 302 or SOX 404, and zero otherwise;  Ind Herf = company Herfindahl concentration in the industry, calculated as  ni is1 2 ,  where i is a company and s is market share calculated using revenue. An industry is defined as a three-digit NAICS industry;    
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Au Herf = auditor Herfindahl concentration in the industry, calculated as  ni is1 2 ,  where i is an audit firm and s is market share calculated using audit fees. An industry is defined as a three-digit NAICS industry;  CLead = an indicator variable set equal to one if the auditor has more than 33.3 percent of all audit fees in the company’s three-digit NAICS industry and Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA), and zero otherwise;   Short Ten = an indicator variable set equal to one if the company’s audit is a  first-, second-, or third-year engagement, and zero otherwise;  YearFE = an indicator variable for each fiscal year;   IndustryFE = an indicator variable for each three-digit NAICS industry; and  ε = error term.  β5, β6, β7, and β8, are the coefficients of interest and I expect them to be positive and significant, 
indicating that there is a positive association between deviations from industry norms and audit 
fees. I also present results for models replacing Dev Ret, Dev Vol, Dev ZScore, and Dev Lev in 
equation (1) with i) Trc Dev Ret, Trc Dev Vol, Trc Dev ZScore, and Trc Dev Lev and ii) Count 
Trc Dev, which are as previously described.  
 I obtain financial statement data from Compustat, auditor data from Audit Analytics, and 
stock-related data from CRSP. I include controls for company, audit engagement, auditor, and 
industry characteristics that have been shown to be associated with audit fees and that may also 
be associated with my measures of deviation from industry norms. I include Ret, Vol, ZScore, 
and Lev to control for the company-specific level of risk related to my variables of interest.13 Ln 
AT and Ln Rev control for company size. I include Curr, FCF, Loss, and GCO as additional 
                                                 13 Including the company-specific level of each risk factor as a control variable is important to help ensure that my variables of interest are capturing risk related to deviation from industry norms that is incremental to the underlying riskiness of the company.  
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controls for the financial condition of the company. CF Vol and Rev Vol control for company 
volatility and Ln Seg, Foreign, and Merge control for company complexity. I include Mat Weak 
to control for risk related to the company’s internal control over financial reporting. I include 
Busy and Short Ten to control for engagement characteristics associated with audit fees. I include 
BigN and CLead to control for auditor type. I include Au Herf and Ind Herf because the level of 
competition related to the industry is likely to be associated with audit fees and may be 
associated with deviations from industry norms. Lastly, I include year fixed effects (YearFE) and 
industry fixed effects (IndustryFE) based on three-digit NAICS codes to control for systematic 
variation across time and across industries.  
Next, I model the likelihood of misstatement as a function of my measures of deviation 
from industry norms with the same set of control variables using Logistic regression. 
 Misstateit = δ0 + δ1Retit + δ2Volit + δ3ZScoreit + δ4Levit + δ5Dev Retit +    δ6Dev Volit + δ7Dev ZScoreit + δ8Dev Levit + δ9Ln ATit +    δ10Ln Revit + δ11Currit + δ12FCFit + δ13CF Volit + δ14Rev Volit + δ15Ln Segit + δ16Foreignit + δ17Lossit + δ18GCOit + δ19Busyit + δ20BigNit + δ21Mergeit + δ22Mat Weakit + δ23Ind Herfit +    δ24Au Herfit + δ25CLeadit + δ26Short Tenit + δjYearFE + δjIndustryFE + εit      (2)  where:  Misstate = an indicator variable set equal to one if the company subsequently restates current year financial statements, and zero otherwise. Restatements are limited to those reported in a form 8-K (“Big R” restatements), following Aobdia (2017) and Tan and Young (2015).   All other variables are as previously described. I obtain restatement data from the Audit 
Analytics Non-Reliance Restatements database. Misstate is set equal to one only for “Big R” 
restatements that require disclosure in a separate 8-K filing (Aobdia 2017; Tan and Young 2015) 
because “little r” restatements (those not disclosed on a separate 8-K filing) are less severe and 
are immaterial for each reporting period and because previous literature finds that “little r” 
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restatements disproportionately affect Big Four auditors after 2008 (Rowe and Sivadasan 2016). 
δ5, δ6, δ7, and δ8, are the coefficients of interest and I expect them to be positive and significant, 
indicating that there is a positive association between deviations from industry norms and the 
likelihood of misstatement. As for equation (1), I also present results for models replacing Dev 
Ret, Dev Vol, Dev ZScore, and Dev Lev in equation (2) with i) Trc Dev Ret, Trc Dev Vol, Trc 
Dev ZScore, and Trc Dev Lev and ii) Count Trc Dev.  
Sample 
 As reported in Table 1, I begin with the intersection of companies covered by Compustat 
and Audit Analytics from 2004 through 2013, 70,893 company-year observations. This is the 
sample that I use to construct median risk factors by industry-year for my measures of deviation. 
I begin in 2004 to avoid possible confounding effects related to the passage of the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act in 2002 and its implementation. I end in 2013 to allow sufficient time for 
misstatements to be identified and revealed through restatements. I drop 1,861 observations that 
are missing NAICS industry identifiers. Similar to prior audit literature, I drop 21,400 
observations for companies in financial industries and utilities industries because risks for these 
regulated industries are likely to depend to a greater degree on factors beyond the control of 
managers (e.g., interest-rate spreads and costs of inputs such as coal and crude oil) than for other 
industries (Hutton, Lee, and Shu 2012). As discussed previously, I require at least ten 
observations for each industry-year for calculating the risk factor medians used to construct my 
measures of deviation. Accordingly, I drop 1,426 observations that have fewer than ten 
observations in an industry-year. I drop an additional 21,212 observations because of missing 
variables. Lastly, I exclude 94 observations that cannot be included in the misstatement models 
because they are in three-digit NAICS industries that don’t have any misstatements for sample 
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companies during the sample period (i.e., the misstatement models cannot include these 
observations because of perfect collinearity). My final sample consists of 24,900 company-year 
observations. 
 Table 2 presents a listing of the three-digit NAICS industries included in my final 
sample. Column (1) reports the number of sample observations in each industry and the 
percentage of the total sample observations represented by each industry. Column (2) reports the 
number of Compustat observations in each industry and the percentage of Compustat 
observations represented by each industry during my sample period for comparison.14 While 
there are small differences between the industry percentages for sample companies and for 
Compustat, Table 2 suggests that industries are generally represented in the sample in similar 
proportions to Compustat.  
IV. Primary Analyses 
Descriptive Statistics 
I provide descriptive statistics for the sample in Table 3.15 The mean raw stock return for 
sample observations is about 14.9 percent during the sample period (Ret).16 Mean volatility is 
0.0335 (Vol). Sample companies have a mean financial distress score of -0.3246 (ZScore). 
Sample companies have mean leverage of 0.4955 (Lev). As expected, Dev Ret, Dev Vol, Dev 
                                                 14 This table only includes industries that are in my final sample. The complete Compustat download includes a total of 88,099 observations from fyear 2004 through 2013 with non-missing NAICS identifiers, representing 96 industries. My sample includes fewer industries than this primarily because I exclude financial and utilities industries and require at least ten observations per industry-year.   15 All continuous variables presented in Table 3 and used in subsequent regressions are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. 16 It is important to remember that Ret and ZScore are constructed by multiplying the company’s raw return and financial distress score, respectively, by negative one, so that larger values of Ret indicate lower returns and larger values of ZScore indicate greater financial distress. 
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ZScore, and Dev Lev have medians close to zero (-0.0020, 0.0000, -0.0064, and -0.0015, 
respectively) because they are standardized using a standard deviation measure modified to use 
the median instead of the mean. Also, as expected for standardized variables, Dev Ret and Dev 
Vol have standard deviations close to one (0.9836 and 0.9358, respectively). However, Dev 
ZScore and Dev Lev have standard deviations of 0.3355 and 0.3715, respectively. This indicates 
that companies included in the final sample are relatively less financially distressed and 
leveraged than the companies included in the larger sample used to calculate the industry-year 
median ZScore and Lev.17 The median of Count Trc Dev is 1 and the mean is 1.3333, indicating 
that slightly more than half of sample companies are in the top tercile of the distribution of at 
least one measure of deviation from industry norms. Descriptives for the remaining control 
variables are similar to those from prior literature (e.g., Cassell, Drake, and Rasmussen 2011; 
Numan and Willekens 2012; and Cairney and Stewart 2015).  
Table 4 presents Pearson’s correlation coefficients. Coefficients in bold are significant at 
the ten percent level. Deviations from the industry for returns, volatility, and financial distress 
are generally negatively and significantly correlated with Ln Fees while deviations for leverage 
are positively and significantly correlated with Ln Fees. All deviation measures are generally 
positively and significantly correlated with Misstate. This provides univariate evidence 
                                                 17 The industry-year medians that I use to create my measures of deviation include all possible observations while my sample only includes observations that have all variables needed for the regressions. Accordingly, I create Dev ZScore and Dev Lev using all possible Compustat observations while Dev Ret and Dev Vol require CRSP data, which is only available for a smaller subset of observations. When I eliminate observations from the sample because of missing variables, I disproportionately eliminate observations that have Dev ZScore and Dev Lev but are missing Dev Ret and Dev Vol. Immediately before eliminating observations because of missing variables, descriptive statistics indicate that Dev ZScore has a median of 0.0000 and standard deviation of 0.9653 and that Dev Lev has a mean of -0.0000 and standard deviation of 0.9853, as expected for standardized variables. Inferences remain unchanged if I calculate my measures of deviation using the final sample instead of the largest possible sample. 
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suggesting that deviations from industry norms increase audit risk but that auditors do not 
identify and respond to this risk appropriately. However, Table 4 also indicates that there are a 
number of significant correlations affecting the variables of interest, potentially confounding 
inferences based on univariate evidence. The correlations also suggest that multicollinearity may 
be a concern. Accordingly, I examine variance inflation factors (vifs) and find that vifs are below 
nine for the variables of interest in all of the primary analyses. This suggests that 
multicollinearity is unlikely to substantially affect the results.     
Main Tests 
 Table 5 presents the results of my tests of H1. The dependent variable is Ln Fees. Column 
(1) presents results using the continuous measures of deviation from industry norms (Dev Ret, 
Dev Vol, Dev ZScore, and Dev Lev). The coefficient on Dev ZScore is positive and significant 
(coefficient 0.047, t-statistic 2.616). This indicates that companies that deviate from the industry 
median to a greater degree for this risk factor pay higher audit fees than other companies. 
However, the remaining coefficients of interest are insignificant, suggesting that deviations from 
industry norms for returns, return volatility, and leverage are not associated with audit fees. 
Column (2) presents results using the top tercile indicator measures of deviation from industry 
norms (Trc Dev Ret, Trc Dev Vol, Trc Dev ZScore, and Trc Dev Lev). The coefficients on Trc 
Dev Vol (coefficient 0.026, t-statistic 2.267) and Trc Dev ZScore (coefficient 0.108, t-statistic 
7.721) are positive and significant. This indicates that companies in the top tercile of these 
measures of deviation pay higher audit fees than companies in the first and second terciles. The 
coefficients on Trc Dev Ret and Trc Dev Lev are insignificant, suggesting that deviations from 
industry norms for returns and leverage are not associated with audit fees, even for companies 
that are substantially different from industry norms. Column (3) presents results using the count 
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of top tercile indicators measure of deviation from industry norms (Count Trc Dev). The 
coefficient is positive and significant (coefficient 0.035, t-statistic 6.130), indicating that 
companies that deviate from industry norms across multiple risk factors pay higher audit fees 
than other companies.   
 Taken together, results from Table 5 provide evidence that audit fees are associated with 
deviations from industry norms for multiple risk factors, suggesting that auditors identify and 
respond to risks reflected in deviations from industry norms. The results also suggest that the 
relation between deviations from industry norms and audit fees is nonlinear, at least for certain 
risk factors. Specifically, the Dev Vol coefficient is insignificant in Column (1) but the Trc Dev 
Vol coefficient is positive and significant in Column (2). This suggests that, for risks related to 
return volatility, it is primarily companies that are substantially riskier than industry norms that 
pay higher audit fees. Results from Column (3) are also consistent with this interpretation, 
suggesting that companies that are riskier than industry norms across multiple risk factors pay 
higher audit fees than other companies. 
 The relation between the control variables and audit fees are generally consistent with 
prior literature. Financially distressed companies (ZScore, Curr, Loss, and GCO), large 
companies (Ln AT and Ln Rev), and more complex companies (Ln Seg, Foreign, and Merge) pay 
higher audit fees than other companies. December fiscal-year end (Busy) engagements, Big Four 
auditor (BigN) engagements, industry specialist auditor (CLead) engagements, and internal 
control material weaknesses (Mat Weak) are associated with higher audit fees. Lastly, cash flow 
volatility (CF Vol), industry concentration (Ind Herf), and short auditor tenure (Short Ten) are 
negatively associated with audit fees. 
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 Table 6 presents the results of my tests of H2. The dependent variable is Misstate. 
Column (1) presents results using the continuous measures of deviation from industry norms 
(Dev Ret, Dev Vol, Dev ZScore, and Dev Lev). Column (2) presents results using the top tercile 
indicator measures of deviation from industry norms (Trc Dev Ret, Trc Dev Vol, Trc Dev ZScore, 
and Trc Dev Lev). None of the coefficients of interest are statistically significant in Columns (1) 
or (2), suggesting that deviations from industry norms are not associated with the likelihood of 
misstatement, on average. Column (3) presents results using the count of top tercile indicators 
measure of deviation from industry norms (Count Trc Dev). The coefficient is positive and 
significant (coefficient 0.080, z-statistic 1.734), indicating that companies that deviate from 
industry norms across multiple risk factors have a higher likelihood of misstatement than other 
companies. 
 Results from Table 6 provide limited evidence that deviations from industry norms are 
associated with an increased likelihood of misstatement. However, the findings presented in 
Table 5 indicate that auditors respond to deviations from industry norms. Insofar as audit fees 
proxy for audit effort, this suggests that auditors respond to deviations from industry norms by 
changing the nature, timing, and extent of substantive audit procedures. If auditors respond 
appropriately to risk reflected in deviations from industry norms, then their response should 
mitigate any association between these deviations and the likelihood of misstatement. Consistent 
with this interpretation, results from Table 6 may indicate that auditors generally respond 
appropriately to deviations from industry norms, mitigating the negative effects of deviations on 
audit outcomes.  
The relation between the control variables and the likelihood of misstatement are 
generally consistent with prior literature. Return volatility (Vol), leverage (Lev), company size 
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(Ln AT), the number business and geographic segments (Ln Seg), and internal control material 
weaknesses (Mat Weak) are positively associated with the likelihood of misstatement while FCF, 
Foreign, GCO, and Busy are negatively associated with the likelihood of misstatement.  
Big Four Auditors 
 Table 7 presents the results of my tests of H3. Panel A is identical to Table 5 except that I 
add interaction terms between BigN and my variables of interest to equation (1). The dependent 
variable is Ln Fees. Column (1) presents results using the continuous measures of deviation from 
industry norms (Dev Ret, Dev Vol, Dev ZScore, and Dev Lev). The coefficients on Dev Vol and 
Dev Lev are negative and significant (coefficients -0.042 and -0.065, respectively, t-statistics -
3.335 and -1.810, respectively), indicating that companies with non-Big Four auditors that 
deviate from the industry median to a greater degree for these risk factors pay lower audit fees 
than other companies.18 Interestingly, the interaction terms suggest that Big Four auditors are 
more responsive to deviations from industry norms for return volatility and leverage than non-
Big Four auditors. Specifically, the coefficient on BigN*Dev Vol is 0.072 (t-statistic 5.878), and 
the coefficient on BigN*Dev Lev is 0.112 (t-statistic 3.006). The remaining interaction terms are 
insignificant, suggesting that Big Four auditors price deviations from industry norms for returns 
and for financial distress similarly to non-Big Four auditors.  
Column (2) presents results using the top tercile indicator measures of deviation from 
industry norms (Trc Dev Ret, Trc Dev Vol, Trc Dev ZScore, and Trc Dev Lev). Consistent with 
Table 5, the Trc Dev ZScore coefficient is positive and significant (coefficient 0.116, t-statistic 
                                                 18 The negative relation between these factors and audit fees is inconsistent with my expectations and with theory. While I don’t have an intuitive explanation for the negative relation, I interpret these results as evidence that non-Big Four auditors misprice these risk factors. Results from my misstatement regressions are consistent with a mispricing interpretation for the negative relation between Dev Lev and Ln Fees.  
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4.665) while the coefficients on Trc Dev Vol and Trc Dev Lev are negative and significant 
(coefficients -0.050 and -0.098, respectively, t-statistics -2.343 and -3.590, respectively). As in 
Column (1), the interaction terms suggest that Big Four auditors are more responsive to 
deviations from industry norms than non-Big Four auditors. Specifically, the coefficient on 
BigN*Trc Dev Vol is 0.106 (t-statistic 4.539) and the coefficient on BigN*Dev Lev is 0.128 (t-
statistic 4.572). The coefficients on BigN*Trc Dev Ret and BigN*Trc Dev ZScore are 
insignificant, suggesting that Big Four auditors price substantial deviations from industry norms 
for returns and financial distress similarly to non-Big Four auditors. Column (3) presents results 
using the count of top tercile indicators measure of deviation from industry norms (Count Trc 
Dev). The Count Trc Dev coefficient is insignificant. However, the BigN*Count Trc Dev 
coefficient is positive and significant (coefficient 0.053, t-statistic 5.038), providing further 
evidence that Big Four auditors are more responsive to deviations from industry norms than non-
Big Four auditors.  
Table 7 Panel B presents the results of F-tests used to test whether the total effects of my 
measures of deviation from industry norms on audit fees are statistically significant for Big Four 
auditors. Specifically, I test whether the sum of the coefficients on the variables of interest and 
the Big Four interaction terms is equal to zero. The results indicate that the sum of the 
coefficients related to my continuous measures of deviation from industry norms are positive and 
significant for return volatility (Dev Vol + BigN*Dev Vol, F-statistic 7.023), financial distress 
(Dev ZScore + BigN*Dev Zscore, F-statistic 5.784), and leverage (Dev Lev + BigN*Dev Lev, F-
statistic 7.435), though not for returns (Dev Ret + BigN*Dev Ret, F-statistic 0.041). Similarly, the 
results indicate that the sum of the coefficients related to my top tercile indicator measures are 
positive and significant for return volatility (Trc Dev Vol + BigN*Trc Dev Vol, F-statistic 
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19.954), financial distress (Trc Dev ZScore + BigN*Trc Dev Zscore, F-statistic 47.061), and 
leverage (Trc Dev Lev + BigN*Trc Dev Lev, F-statistic 4.884), though not for returns (Trc Dev 
Ret + BigN*Trc Dev Ret, F-statistic 0.019). Lastly, the results also indicate that the total effect of 
deviations from industry norms across multiple risk factors is positive and significant for Big 
Four auditors. Specifically, the F-statistic for the sum of Count Trc Dev and BigN*Count Trc 
Dev is 60.708.   
 Taken together, results from Table 7 provide strong evidence that audit fees are positively 
associated with my measures of deviation from industry norms for clients of Big Four auditors, 
suggesting that these auditors respond to risks reflected in deviations from industry norms. 
Results for non-Big Four auditors suggest that these auditors are less responsive to deviations 
from industry norms than Big Four auditors. Specifically, Table 7 provides some evidence that 
non-Big Four auditors charge higher audit fees related to deviations from industry norms for 
financial distress but not related to deviations for the other risk factors.  
 Table 8 presents the results of my tests of H4. Panel A is identical to Table 6 except that I 
add interaction terms between BigN and my variables of interest to equation (2). The dependent 
variable is Misstate. Column (1) presents results using the continuous measures of deviation 
from industry norms (Dev Ret, Dev Vol, Dev ZScore, and Dev Lev). The coefficient on Dev Lev 
is positive and significant (coefficient 0.425, z-statistic 2.176), indicating that companies with 
non-Big Four auditors that deviate from the industry median to a greater degree for this risk 
factor have a higher likelihood of misstatement than other companies. The remaining coefficients 
on my measures of deviation are insignificant. The BigN*Dev Lev coefficient is negative and 
significant (coefficient -0.504, z-statistic -2.327), indicating that the likelihood of misstatement 
related to deviations from industry norms for leverage is lower for companies with Big Four 
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auditors than for companies with non-Big Four auditors. None of the variables of interest are 
statistically significant in Column (2) or Column (3).     
Table 8 Panel B presents results of chi-squared tests used to investigate the total effects 
of my measures of deviation from industry norms on the likelihood of misstatement for Big Four 
auditors. Specifically, I test whether the sum of the coefficients on the variables of interest and 
the Big Four interaction terms is equal to zero. The results of the chi-squared tests indicate that 
the sums of the coefficients are never statistically different from zero. Specifically, the chi-
squared statistics are 0.180 for Dev Ret plus BigN*Dev Ret, 0.556 for Dev Vol plus BigN*Dev 
Vol, 0.135 for Dev ZScore plus BigN*Dev Zscore, and 0.284 for Dev Lev plus BigN*Dev Lev, 
0.951 for Trc Dev Ret plus BigN*Trc Dev Ret, 2.208 for Trc Dev Vol plus BigN*Trc Dev Vol, 
0.055 for Trc Dev ZScore plus BigN*Trc Dev Zscore, 0.103 for Trc Dev Lev plus BigN*Trc Dev 
Lev, and 1.803 for Count Trc Dev plus BigN*Count Trc Dev. 
 Taken together, results from Table 8 provides very limited evidence that deviations from 
industry norms for leverage are associated with adverse audit outcomes for companies with non-
Big Four auditors but that Big Four auditors mitigate this relation. Specifically, the total effect of 
Dev Lev on the likelihood of misstatement is positive and significant for companies audited by 
non-Big Four auditors but not significantly different from zero for companies audited by Big 
Four auditors. Results from Table 7 and Table 8 provide evidence that Big Four auditors are 
more responsive to deviations from industry norms than non-Big Four auditors and that Big Four 
auditors mitigate the adverse effect of deviations from industry norms on audit outcomes, at least 
for certain risk factors. 
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Industry Specialist Auditors 
Table 9 presents the results of my tests of H5. Panel A is identical to Table 5 except that I 
add interaction terms between CLead and my variables of interest to equation (1). The dependent 
variable is Ln Fees. Results for industry specialist auditors are generally similar to those 
presented in Table 7 for Big Four auditors, though somewhat weaker. Column (1) presents 
results using the continuous measures of deviation from industry norms (Dev Ret, Dev Vol, Dev 
ZScore, and Dev Lev). None of the coefficients on the variables of interest are statistically 
significant, indicating that audit fees are not associated with my measures of deviation from 
industry norms for companies with non-specialist auditors. The interaction terms suggest, 
however, that industry specialist auditors are more responsive to deviations from industry norms 
for return volatility than non-specialist auditors. Specifically, the coefficient on CLead*Dev Vol 
is 0.025 (t-statistic 2.291). The remaining interaction terms are insignificant, suggesting that 
industry specialist auditors price deviations from industry norms for returns, financial distress, 
and leverage similarly to non-specialist auditors.  
Column (2) presents results using the top tercile indicator measures of deviation from 
industry norms (Trc Dev Ret, Trc Dev Vol, Trc Dev ZScore, and Trc Dev Lev). The Trc Dev 
ZScore coefficient is positive and significant (coefficient 0.106, t-statistic 5.688) and the Trc Dev 
Lev coefficient is negative and significant (coefficient -0.037, t-statistic -1.963). The coefficients 
on the remaining measures of deviation are insignificant. As in Column (1), the interaction terms 
suggest that industry specialist auditors are more responsive to deviations from industry norms 
than non-specialist auditors. Specifically, the coefficient on CLead*Trc Dev Vol is 0.036 (t-
statistic 1.820) and the coefficient on CLead*Dev Lev is 0.069 (t-statistic 3.199). The 
coefficients on CLead*Trc Dev Ret and CLead*Trc Dev ZScore are insignificant, suggesting that 
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industry specialist auditors price substantial deviations from industry norms for returns and 
financial distress similarly to non-specialist auditors. Column (3) presents results using the count 
of top tercile indicators measure of deviations from industry norms (Count Trc Dev). The Count 
Trc Dev coefficient is positive and significant (coefficient 0.021, t-statistic 2.867), indicating that 
non-specialist auditors respond to deviations from industry norms across multiple risk factors. 
The CLead*Count Trc Dev coefficient is also positive and significant (coefficient 0.024, t-
statistic 2.907), however, providing further evidence that industry specialist auditors are more 
responsive to deviations from industry norms than non-specialist auditors.  
Table 9 Panel B presents the results of F-tests used to test whether the total effects of my 
measures of deviation from industry norms on audit fees are statistically significant for industry 
specialist auditors. Specifically, I test whether the sum of the coefficients on the variables of 
interest and the CLead interaction terms is equal to zero. The results indicate that the sum of the 
coefficients related to my continuous measures of deviation from the industry are positive and 
significant for financial distress (Dev ZScore + CLead*Dev Zscore, F-statistic 8.818), though not 
for returns (Dev Ret + CLead*Dev Ret, F-statistic 0.068), return volatility (Dev Vol + 
CLead*Dev Vol, F-statistic 0.596), or leverage (Dev Lev + CLead*Dev Lev, F-statistic 0.541). 
The results indicate that the sum of the coefficients related to my top tercile indicator measures 
are positive and significant for all measures of deviation except for returns. Specifically, the F-
statistic for the sum of the coefficients is 8.953 related to return volatility (Trc Dev Vol + 
CLead*Trc Dev Vol), 42.421 related to financial distress (Trc Dev ZScore + CLead*Trc Dev 
Zscore), and 4.113 related to leverage (Trc Dev Lev + CLead*Trc Dev Lev). Lastly, the results 
indicate that the total effect of deviations from industry norms across multiple risk factors is 
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positive and significant for industry specialist auditors. Specifically, the F-statistic for the sum of 
Count Trc Dev and CLead*Count Trc Dev is 45.093.   
 Taken together, results from Table 9 provide evidence that audit fees are associated with 
deviations from industry norms for industry specialist auditors, suggesting that these auditors 
identify and respond to risks reflected in deviations from industry norms. Results for non-
specialist auditors are much weaker, suggesting that these auditors are less responsive to 
deviations from industry norms than industry specialist auditors.  
 Table 10 presents the results of my tests of H6. Panel A is identical to Table 6 except that 
I add interaction terms between CLead and my variables of interest to equation (2). The 
dependent variable is Misstate. Results related to industry specialist auditors are similar to those 
related to Big Four auditors in the misstatement regressions presented in Table 8. Column (1) 
presents results using the continuous measures of deviation from industry norms (Dev Ret, Dev 
Vol, Dev ZScore, and Dev Lev). The coefficient on Dev Lev is positive and significant 
(coefficient 0.430, z-statistic 2.017), indicating that companies with non-specialist auditors that 
deviate from the industry median to a greater degree for this risk factor have a higher likelihood 
of misstatement than other companies. The remaining coefficients on my measures of deviation 
are insignificant. The CLead*Dev Lev coefficient is negative and significant (coefficient -0.504, 
z-statistic -2.327), indicating that the likelihood of misstatement related to deviations from 
industry norms for leverage is lower for companies with industry specialist auditors than for 
companies with non-specialist auditors. However, none of the coefficients on my measures of 
deviation from industry norms or the interaction terms are significant in Column (2) or Column 
(3).   
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Consistent with my findings related to Big Four auditors, the results of chi-squared tests 
presented in Table 10 Panel B indicate that the sums of the coefficients for industry specialist 
auditors are never statistically different from zero. Specifically, the chi-squared statistics are 
0.044 for Dev Ret plus CLead*Dev Ret, 0.171 for Dev Vol plus CLead*Dev Vol, 0.045 for Dev 
ZScore plus CLead*Dev Zscore, 0.037 for Dev Lev plus CLead*Dev Lev, 0.554 for Trc Dev Ret 
plus CLead*Trc Dev Ret, 1.030 for Trc Dev Vol plus CLead*Trc Dev Vol, 0.912 for Trc Dev 
ZScore plus CLead*Trc Dev Zscore, 0.408 for Trc Dev Lev plus CLead*Trc Dev Lev, and 1.911 
for Count Trc Dev plus CLead*Count Trc Dev. 
 Taken together, results from Table 10 provide very limited evidence that deviations from 
industry norms for leverage are associated with adverse audit outcomes for companies with non-
specialist auditors but that industry specialist auditors mitigate this relation. Specifically, the total 
effect of Dev Lev on the likelihood of misstatement is positive and significant for companies 
audited by non-specialist auditors but not significantly different from zero for companies audited 
by industry specialist auditors. Results from Table 9 and Table 10 provide some evidence that 
industry specialist auditors are more responsive to deviations from industry norms than non-
specialist auditors and that industry specialist auditors mitigate the association between 
deviations from industry norms and adverse audit outcomes for certain risk factors.  
 Overall, the results presented in Tables 7 through 10 indicate that certain auditor types 
that prior literature finds to be associated with higher audit quality are more responsive to 
deviations from industry norms than other auditors. These results also indicate that, at least for 
certain risk factors, this greater attention mitigates the relation between deviations from industry 
norms and adverse audit outcomes. 
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V. Additional Analyses 
Magnitude of the Deviations 
 The variables of interest in the primary analyses use measures of deviation from industry 
norms that are standardized so that the relative distance of a company from the industry median 
is comparable between industries. A potential limitation of these measures is that they do not 
allow for differences in the magnitude of the deviation relative to other industries.19 In this 
section, I re-estimate the main tests using alternative measures of deviation from industry norms 
that allow for differences in the magnitude of the deviation. Specifically, I create a continuous 
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 Where: i indicates a company, j indicates a three-digit NAICS industry, and t indicates the fiscal 
year. I create a separate deviation measure for each risk factor by replacing Var in the equation 
with the appropriate risk factor. Specifically: 
Pct Ret = Var is replaced with Ret, the company’s raw return for the year, multiplied by negative one.  Pct Vol = Var is replaced with Vol, the standard deviation of the company’s daily stock returns over the prior year.  Pct ZScore = Var is replaced with ZScore, the company’s financial distress score, multiplied by negative one. Estimated using Altman’s (1968) model as modified by Shumway (2001): ZScore = [1.2*WC/TA + 0.6*RE/TA + 10.0*EBIT/TA + 0.05*ME/TL - 0.47*S/TA]*[-1], where: WC is current assets minus current liabilities, TA is total assets, RE is retained earnings, EBIT is earnings before interest and taxes, ME is the end-of-year share price times total common shares outstanding, and S is total revenue.                                                  19 For example, companies in industries with low (high) dispersion for a particular risk factor may be in (out of) the top tercile of the distribution for that risk factor even though the magnitude of their deviation from the industry median is relatively small (large). 
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 Pct Lev = Var is replaced with Lev, the company’s total liabilities divided by average total assets.  Following the same methodology used to create the variables of interest for the primary analyses, 
I also create top tercile indicator variables (Trc Pct Ret, Trc Pct Vol, Trc Pct ZScore, and Trc Pct 
Lev) and a count of top tercile indicators variable (Count Trc Pct).  
 Tables 11 and 12 present the results of equations (1) and (2) using the Pct Var measures 
of deviation from industry norms. The dependent variable in Table 11 is Ln Fees. Column (1) 
presents results using the continuous measures of deviation from industry norms (Pct Ret, Pct 
Vol, Pct ZScore, and Pct Lev). The coefficient on Pct ZScore is positive and significant 
(coefficient 0.001, t-statistic 3.471). Column (2) presents results using the top tercile indicator 
measures of deviation from industry norms (Trc Pct Ret, Trc Pct Vol, Trc Pct ZScore, and Trc 
Pct Lev). The coefficients on Trc Pct Vol (coefficient 0.023, t-statistic 1.989) and Trc Pct ZScore 
(coefficient 0.095, t-statistic 6.541) are positive and significant. Column (3) presents results 
using the count of top tercile indicators measure of deviation from industry norms (Count Trc 
Pct). The coefficient is positive and significant (coefficient 0.032, t-statistic 5.44). The remaining 
coefficients of interest in Table 11 are insignificant.  
The dependent variable in Table 12 is Misstate. Column (1) presents results using the 
continuous measures of deviation from industry norms (Pct Ret, Pct Vol, Pct ZScore, and Pct 
Lev), Column (2) presents results using the top tercile indicator measures of deviation from 
industry norms (Trc Pct Ret, Trc Pct Vol, Trc Pct ZScore, and Trc Pct Lev), and Column (3) 
presents results using the count of top tercile indicators measure of deviation from industry 
norms (Count Trc Pct). The coefficient on Count Trc Pct is positive and significant (coefficient 
0.099, z-statistic 2.067) while the remaining coefficients on the variables of interest are not 
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statistically significant. The results in Tables 11 and 12 are very similar to the results from the 
main tests presented in Tables 5 and 6. Inferences are unchanged when using the Pct Var 
measures of deviation from industry norms. 
Deviations Measured Using Industry Means 
 The primary analyses use the industry median as the benchmark for estimating deviations 
from the industry norm. In this section, I re-estimate the main tests using measures of deviation 
from the industry mean in order to investigate the sensitivity of my results to using the median as 
the benchmark. Specifically, I create a continuous measure of the deviation from the industry 
mean by fiscal year, as follows: 


  jtit jtitit Varstd VarVarMeanDevVar )( )()( . 
Where: i indicates a company, j indicates a three-digit NAICS industry, and t indicates the fiscal 
year. I require each industry-year to have at least ten observations for calculating the industry 
mean for each risk factor. Following the same methodology used to create the variables of 
interest for the primary analyses, I create four continuous measures of deviation (Dev Ret 
(Mean), Dev Vol (Mean), Dev ZScore (Mean), and Dev Lev (Mean)), top tercile indicator 
variables (Trc Dev Ret (Mean), Trc Dev Vol (Mean), Trc Dev ZScore (Mean), and Trc Dev Lev 
(Mean)), and a count of top tercile indicators variable (Count Trc Dev (Mean)).   
 Tables 13 and 14 present the results of equations (1) and (2) using the Dev Var (Mean) 
measures of deviation from industry norms. The coefficient on Dev ZScore (Mean) is 0.044 (t-
statistic 2.417), the coefficient on Trc Dev Vol (Mean) is 0.027 (t-statistic 2.433), the coefficient 
on Trc Dev ZScore (Mean) is 0.064 (t-statistic 5.548), and the coefficient on Count Trc Dev 
(Mean) is 0.026 (t-statistic 4.628). The remaining coefficients on the variables of interest are not 
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statistically significant. The signs and significance of the coefficients in Table 13 are similar to 
those in Table 5, suggesting that the equation (1) results are not sensitive to using the mean 
instead of the median as the benchmark for the industry norm.  
The results in Table 14 differ somewhat from the results in Table 6, however. 
Specifically, the coefficient on Count Trc Dev (Mean) is not statistically significant (coefficient 
0.059, z-statistic 1.287) while the coefficient on Trc Dev Ret (Mean) is positive and significant 
(coefficient 0.157, z-static 1.823). The remaining coefficients on the variables of interest are not 
statistically significant.  
In order to investigate the extent of the sensitivity of the misstatement results to using the 
mean as the industry benchmark, I re-estimate the Big Four auditor and industry specialist 
auditor specifications presented in Tables 8 and 10 using the Dev Var (Mean) measures of 
deviation from industry norms. The results (untabulated) indicate that inferences are unchanged. 
Specifically, the results suggest that Big Four auditors and industry specialist auditors are more 
responsive to deviations from industry norms and that these auditors mitigate the positive 
association between deviations from industry norms for leverage and the likelihood of 
misstatement. Taken together, the results from the tests discussed in this section suggest that 
overall inferences are not sensitive to using the mean instead of the median as the industry 
benchmark. 
Mid-tier Auditors 
 The primary analyses investigate whether Big Four auditors are more responsive to 
deviations from industry norms than smaller auditors. However, mid-tier auditors, particularly 
the largest mid-tier auditors (Grant Thornton LLP and BDO USA, LLP), are also likely to have 
substantial resources and may have access to a similar quantity and quality of industry-level 
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information relative to Big Four auditors. Moreover, prior literature indicates that mid-tier 
auditors have similar audit quality and similar financial reporting credibility post SOX relative to 
Big Four auditors (Boone, Khurana, and Raman 2010; Cassell, Giroux, Myers, and Omer 2013). 
I investigate whether mid-tier auditors respond similarly to deviations from industry norms 
relative to Big Four auditors in Table 15 and Table 16. These tables present the results of 
equations (1) and (2) after replacing BigN with BigN-MidN. BigN-MidN is an indicator variable 
set equal to one if the company is audited by Deloitte & Touche LLP, Ernst & Young LLP, 
KPMG LLP, PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP, Grant Thornton LLP, or BDO USA, LLP, and zero 
otherwise.  
 Table 15 Panel A presents the results of equation (1). The dependent variable is Ln Fees. 
Column (1) presents results using the continuous measures of deviation from industry norms 
(Dev Ret, Dev Vol, Dev ZScore, and Dev Lev). None of the coefficients on the variables of 
interest are statistically significant with the exception of the BigN-MidN*Dev Vol interaction 
term (coefficient 0.029, t-statistic 2.240). Column (2) presents results using the top tercile 
indicator measures of deviation from industry norms (Trc Dev Ret, Trc Dev Vol, Trc Dev ZScore, 
and Trc Dev Lev). Consistent with the results using the BigN indicator presented in Table 7, the 
Trc Dev ZScore coefficient is positive and significant (coefficient 0.163, t-statistic 5.741) and the 
coefficient on Trc Dev Lev is negative and significant (coefficient -0.096, t-statistic -3.147). 
However, the coefficient on Trc Dev Vol is not statistically significant. Also consistent with 
Table 7, the coefficients on BigN-MidN*Trc Dev Vol and BigN*Dev Lev are positive and 
significant (coefficients 0.048 and 0.120, respectively, t-statistics 1.823 and 3.924, respectively). 
The coefficient on BigN-MidN*Trc Dev ZScore, however, is negative and significant (coefficient 
-0.073, t-statistic -2.484). Column (3) presents results using the count of top tercile indicators 
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measure of deviation from industry norms (Count Trc Dev). Both the Count Trc Dev and BigN-
MidN*Count Trc Dev coefficients are positive and significant (coefficients 0.021 and 0.019, 
respectively, t-statistics 1.783 and 1.645, respectively).   
Table 15 Panel B presents the results of F-tests used to test whether the total effects of 
my measures of deviation from industry norms on audit fees are statistically significant for BigN-
MidN auditors. The results are similar to the results for BigN auditors presented in Table 7 Panel 
B, though the joint tests generally have smaller F-statistics (i.e., the results are weaker). 
Specifically, the results indicate that the sum of the coefficients related to my continuous 
measures of deviation from industry norms are positive and significant for financial distress (Dev 
ZScore + BigN-MidN*Dev Zscore, F-statistic 5.402) and leverage (Dev Lev + BigN-MidN*Dev 
Lev, F-statistic 4.050), but not for returns (Dev Ret + BigN-MidN*Dev Ret, F-statistic 0.160) or 
return volatility (Dev Vol + BigN-MidN*Dev Vol, F-statistic 1.768). The results indicate that the 
sum of the coefficients related to my top tercile indicator measures are positive and significant 
for return volatility (Trc Dev Vol + BigN-MidN*Trc Dev Vol, F-statistic 11.617), financial 
distress (Trc Dev ZScore + BigN-MidN*Trc Dev Zscore, F-statistic 39.126), and leverage (Trc 
Dev Lev + BigN-MidN*Trc Dev Lev, F-statistic 3.155), though not for returns (Trc Dev Ret + 
BigN-MidN*Trc Dev Ret, F-statistic 0.275). Lastly, the the sum of Count Trc Dev and BigN-
MidN*Count Trc Dev is positive and significant (F-statistic 45.598).  
Table 16 presents the results of equation (2). The dependent variable is Misstate. The 
results are similar to the results for BigN auditors presented in Table 8 and all inferences are 
unchanged. In Panel A, Dev Lev is positive and significant (coefficient 0.412, z-statistic 1.914) 
and BigN-MidN*Dev Lev is negative and significant (coefficient -0.457, z-statistic -1.995). In 
Panel B, the results of chi-squared tests indicate that the sums of the coefficients are never 
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statistically different from zero. Consistent with the primary analyses, the results in Table 16 
suggest that the total effect of Dev Lev on the likelihood of misstatement is positive and 
significant for companies audited by smaller auditors but not significantly different from zero for 
companies audited by BigN-MidN auditors. Taken together, results from Tables 15 and 16 
provide evidence that BigN-MidN auditors are more responsive to deviations from industry 
norms than smaller auditors. However, the weaker results in Table 15 compared with Table 7 
suggest that this effect is primarily driven by Big Four auditors.20  
National Industry Specialist Auditors 
 The primary analyses investigate whether industry specialist auditors identified as 
specialists using the MSA industry market (CLead) are more responsive to industry norms than 
other auditors. Some CLead auditors are relatively small audit firms that may not have access to 
the quantity or quality of industry information that larger audit firms can access. As a result, 
national industry expertise may be more relevant in my setting than MSA-level industry 
expertise. I investigate this possibility in Tables 17 and 18. These tables present the results of 
equations (1) and (2) after replacing CLead with NLead. NLead is an indicator variable set equal 
to one if the auditor has the highest percent of audit fees in the company’s three-digit NAICS 
industry, and zero otherwise.21  
                                                 20 Results (untabulated) run separately on three samples (BigN auditors only, MidN auditors only, and smaller auditors only), provide additional support for this interpretation. The signs of the significant coefficients on the variables of interest in the MidN-only regressions are more similar to those in the small auditor-only regressions than those in the BigN-only regressions for audit fees and misstatements. This suggests that MidN auditors identify and respond to deviations from industry norms similarly to smaller auditors.   21 Prior literature also identifies auditors as national industry specialists if they have more than 33.3 percent of all audit fees in the three-digit NAICS industry at the national level. However, this results in substantial overlap between Big Four auditors and those identified as specialists. Results (untabulated) using this alternative national specialist classification are similar (though somewhat weaker) than the results for BigN auditors presented in Tables 7 and 8. 
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 Table 17 Panel A presents the results of equation (1). The dependent variable is Ln Fees. 
Column (1) presents results using the continuous measures of deviation from industry norms 
(Dev Ret, Dev Vol, Dev ZScore, and Dev Lev). The results in Column (1) are somewhat stronger 
than the results for CLead auditors presented in Table 9, suggesting that NLead auditors are more 
responsive to deviations from industry norms than other auditors for three of the four risk factors. 
Specifically, the coefficients on NLead*Dev Vol, NLead*Dev ZScore, and NLead*Dev Lev are 
positive and significant (coefficients 0.029, 0.089, and 0.050, respectively, t-statistics 1.931, 
2.508, and 1.723, respectively).  
Column (2) presents results using the top tercile indicator measures of deviation from 
industry norms (Trc Dev Ret, Trc Dev Vol, Trc Dev ZScore, and Trc Dev Lev) and Column (3) 
presents results using the count of top tercile indicators measure of deviations from industry 
norms (Count Trc Dev). The results in columns Columns (2) and (3) are similar to the results for 
CLead auditors presented in Table 9 and inferences are unchanged.  
Table 17 Panel B presents the results of F-tests used to test whether the total effects of 
my measures of deviation from industry norms on audit fees are statistically significant for 
NLead auditors and results are similar to the results for CLead auditors presented in Table 9 
Panel B. Specifically, the sum of the coefficients related to my continuous measures of deviation 
from the industry are positive and significant for financial distress (Dev ZScore + NLead*Dev 
Zscore, F-statistic 15.438) and leverage (Dev Lev + NLead*Dev Lev, F-statistic 4.160), but not 
for returns (Dev Ret + NLead*Dev Ret, F-statistic 2.189) or return volatility (Dev Vol + 
NLead*Dev Vol, F-statistic 0.898). The sum of the coefficients related to my top tercile indicator 
measures are positive and significant for all measures of deviation except for returns. 
Specifically, the F-statistic for the sum of the coefficients is 12.077 related to return volatility 
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(Trc Dev Vol + NLead*Trc Dev Vol), 16.222 related to financial distress (Trc Dev ZScore + 
NLead*Trc Dev Zscore), and 9.005 related to leverage (Trc Dev Lev + NLead*Trc Dev Lev). 
Lastly, the F-statistic for the sum of Count Trc Dev and NLead*Count Trc Dev is 34.360, 
indicating that the total effect of deviations from industry norms across multiple risk factors is 
positive and significant for NLead auditors. 
Table 18 Panel A presents the results of equation (2). The dependent variable is Misstate. 
The only significant coefficient is the coefficient on the NLead*Trc Dev ZScore interaction in 
Column (2) (coefficient -0.373, z-statistic -1.768). Table 18 Panel B presents the results of the 
chi-squared tests estimating the total effect of deviation from industry norms for companies with 
NLead auditors. While the majority of the results are consistent with those for CLead auditors 
presented in Table 10 Panel B, the sum of Trc Dev Ret and NLead*Trc Dev Ret is positive and 
significant (chi-squared statistic 3.062). This provides limited evidence that the total effect of 
substantial deviation from industry norms for returns is associated with an increased likelihood 
of misstatement for NLead auditors. Overall, the results in Tables 17 and 18 suggest that, 
similarly to CLead auditors, NLead auditors are more responsive to deviations from industry 
norms than other auditors but they provide little evidence that this response is associated with the 
likelihood of misstatement. 
VI. Conclusion 
The purpose of this study is to investigate whether auditors respond to industry-level 
information and how their response affects audit outcomes. Auditing standards indicate that 
industry-level information is important in the assessment of client-level risk but provide auditors 
with little guidance about how they should use industry-level information and the types of 
information that are likely to be important. I propose that one way that auditors may use 
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industry-level information is as a benchmark or norm against which to compare their clients 
when evaluating audit risk. I create measures that capture the extent to which clients deviate 
from industry norms using risk factors identified by prior literature and examine whether 
deviations from industry norms are associated with audit fees and with the likelihood of 
misstatement. 
In my main tests, I find strong evidence that audit fees are positively associated with 
deviations from industry norms, suggesting that auditors identify and respond to risks reflected in 
these deviations. I find limited evidence that deviations from industry norms are associated with 
an increased likelihood of misstatement. These findings suggest that auditors generally 
appropriately incorporate industry-level information in their assessment of client-level risk.  
I also examine whether the effects of deviations from industry norms on audit fees and on 
the likelihood of misstatement vary by auditor type. I find consistent evidence that both Big Four 
and industry specialist auditors are more responsive to deviations from industry norms than other 
auditors. I also find limited evidence that these auditors mitigate the increased likelihood of 
misstatement associated with deviations from industry norms for certain risk factors relative to 
smaller or non-specialist auditors.  
My findings should be of interest to auditors, auditing standard setters, and regulators 
because, while they suggest that auditors generally appropriately identify and respond to 
industry-level information in their assessment of client-level risk, smaller, non-specialist, 
auditors may be able to improve audit outcomes by focusing more carefully on deviations from 
industry norms as an indicator of audit risk. My findings also suggest that additional guidance 
about the types of industry information that are likely to be useful and how to incorporate this 
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industry information in the risk assessment process may help auditors, particularly smaller and 
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Appendix A Variable Definitions  Variables of Interest Definition For the primary analyses, deviation from the industry is estimated by fiscal year as the company-specific risk factor minus the median of the risk factor for the industry, standardized by industry-year. Expressed mathematically:   


  jtit jtitit Varstdmedian VarmedianVarDevVar )(_ ))((  . 
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 Var is replaced with the particular risk factor as detailed below.  Dev Ret = Var is replaced with Ret, the company’s raw return for the year, multiplied by negative one.  Dev Vol = Var is replaced with Vol, the standard deviation of the company’s daily stock returns over the prior year.  Dev ZScore = Var is replaced with ZScore, the company’s financial distress score, multiplied by negative one. Estimated using Altman’s (1968) model as modified by Shumway (2001): ZScore = [1.2*WC/TA + 0.6*RE/TA + 10.0*EBIT/TA + 0.05*ME/TL - 0.47*S/TA]*[-1], where: WC is current assets minus current liabilities, TA is total assets, RE is retained earnings, EBIT is earnings before interest and taxes, ME is the end-of-year share price times total common shares outstanding, and S is total revenue.  Dev Lev = Var is replaced with Lev, the company’s total liabilities divided by average total assets.  Trc Dev Ret = an indicator variable set equal to one if the company’s Dev Ret is in the top tercile of the sample distribution by fiscal year, and zero otherwise.  Trc Dev Vol = an indicator variable set equal to one if the company’s Dev Vol is in the top tercile of the sample distribution by fiscal year, and zero otherwise. 
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Trc Dev ZScore = an indicator variable set equal to one if the company’s Dev ZScore is in the top tercile of the sample distribution by fiscal year, and zero otherwise.  Trc Dev Lev = an indicator variable set equal to one if the company’s Dev Lev is in the top tercile of the sample distribution by fiscal year, and zero otherwise.  Count Trc Dev = the count of the company’s top tercile indicators (Trc Dev Ret, Trc Dev Vol, Trc Dev ZScore, and Trc Dev Lev).  In additional analyses, deviation from the industry is estimated by fiscal year as the company-specific risk factor minus the median of the risk factor for the industry, divided by the absolute value of the median of the risk factor for the industry. Expressed mathematically:   


  |)(| ))(( jt jtitit Varmedian VarmedianVarPctVar . 
 Where: i indicates a company, j indicates a three-digit NAICS industry, and t indicates the fiscal year. Var is replaced with the particular risk factor as detailed below.  Pct Ret = Var is replaced with Ret, the company’s raw return for the year, multiplied by negative one.  Pct Vol = Var is replaced with Vol, the standard deviation of the company’s daily stock returns over the prior year.  Pct ZScore = Var is replaced with ZScore, the company’s financial distress score, multiplied by negative one. Estimated using Altman’s (1968) model as modified by Shumway (2001): ZScore = [1.2*WC/TA + 0.6*RE/TA + 10.0*EBIT/TA + 0.05*ME/TL - 0.47*S/TA]*[-1], where: WC is current assets minus current liabilities, TA is total assets, RE is retained earnings, EBIT is earnings before interest and taxes, ME is the end-of-year share price times total common shares outstanding, and S is total revenue.  Pct Lev = Var is replaced with Lev, the company’s total liabilities divided by average total assets.  Trc Pct Ret = an indicator variable set equal to one if the company’s Pct Ret is in the top tercile of the sample distribution by fiscal year, and zero otherwise.  Trc Pct Vol = an indicator variable set equal to one if the company’s Pct Vol is in the top tercile of the sample distribution by fiscal year, and zero otherwise. 
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Trc Pct ZScore = an indicator variable set equal to one if the company’s Pct ZScore is in the top tercile of the sample distribution by fiscal year, and zero otherwise.  Trc Pct Lev = an indicator variable set equal to one if the company’s Pct Lev is in the top tercile of the sample distribution by fiscal year, and zero otherwise.  Count Trc Pct = the count of the company’s top tercile indicators (Trc Pct Ret, Trc Pct Vol, Trc Pct ZScore, and Trc Pct Lev).  Other Variables Definition Ret = the company’s raw return for the year, multiplied by negative one.  Vol = the standard deviation of the company’s daily stock returns over the prior year.  ZScore = the company’s financial distress score, multiplied by negative one. Estimated using Altman’s (1968) model as modified by Shumway (2001): ZScore = [1.2*WC/TA + 0.6*RE/TA + 10.0*EBIT/TA + 0.05*ME/TL - 0.47*S/TA]*[-1], where: WC is current assets minus current liabilities, TA is total assets, RE is retained earnings, EBIT is earnings before interest and taxes, ME is the end-of-year share price times total common shares outstanding, and S is total revenue.    Lev = the company’s leverage (total liabilities divided by average total assets).  Fees = the company’s total audit fees.  Ln Fees = the natural log of the company’s total audit fees.  Misstate = an indicator variable set equal to one if the company subsequently restates current year financial statements, and zero otherwise. Restatements are limited to those reported in a form 8-K (“Big R” restatements), following Aobdia (2017) and Tan and Young (2015).    AT = the company’s total assets ($ millions).  Ln AT = the natural log of the company’s total assets ($ millions).  Rev = the company’s total revenue ($ millions).  Ln Rev = the natural log of the company’s total revenue ($ millions).  
50 
Curr = the company’s current ratio (current assets divided by current liabilities).  FCF = the company’s free cash flows (cash flow from operations less capital expenditures divided by current assets).  CF Vol = the standard deviation of the company’s net operating cash flow over the prior three years.  Rev Vol = the standard deviation of the company’s total revenue over the prior three years.  Seg = the count of the company’s business and geographic segments.  Ln Seg = the natural log of the count of the company’s business and geographic segments.  Foreign = an indicator variable set equal to one if the company reports foreign pretax income, and zero otherwise.   Loss = an indicator variable set equal to one if the company reports a net loss, and zero otherwise.  GCO = an indicator variable set equal to one if the company receives a going-concern audit opinion, and zero otherwise.  Busy = an indicator variable set equal to one if the company has a December fiscal year-end, and zero otherwise.  BigN = an indicator variable set equal to one if the company is audited by Deloitte & Touche LLP, Ernst & Young LLP, KPMG LLP, or PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP, and zero otherwise.  BigN-MidN = an indicator variable set equal to one if the company is audited by Deloitte & Touche LLP, Ernst & Young LLP, KPMG LLP, PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP, Grant Thornton LLP, or BDO USA, LLP, and zero otherwise.  Merge = an indicator variable set equal to one if the company reports sales from acquisitions, and zero otherwise.  Mat Weak = an indicator variable set equal to one if the company has one or more material weaknesses in internal control identified under SOX 302 or SOX 404, and zero otherwise.  
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Ind Herf = company Herfindahl concentration in the industry, calculated as  ni is1 2 ,  where i is a company and s is market share calculated using revenue. An industry is defined as a three-digit NAICS industry.    Au Herf = auditor Herfindahl concentration in the industry, calculated as  ni is1 2 ,  where i is an audit firm and s is market share calculated using audit fees. An industry is defined as a three-digit NAICS industry.  CLead = an indicator variable set equal to one if the auditor has more than 33.3 percent of all audit fees in the company’s three-digit NAICS industry and Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA), and zero otherwise.  NLead = an indicator variable set equal to one if the auditor has the highest percent of audit fees in the company’s three-digit NAICS industry, and zero otherwise.  Short Ten = an indicator variable set equal to one if the company’s audit is a  first-, second-, or third-year engagement, and zero otherwise.     
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Table 1: Sample Selection 
  Observations in Compustat and Audit Analytics from 2004 through 2013  70,893 Observations missing NAICS industry identifier  -1,861 Financial and utilities companies  -21,400 Observations in industries with fewer than 10 observations           in a year for calculating industry medians  -1,426 Observations missing required variables  -21,212 Observations dropped because of perfect collinearity  -94    Sample  24,900    
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Table 2: Industry Detail Three-digit NAICS 
 (1)  (2) 
  Sample  Compustat     N %   N % 
        Crop Production 111  25 0.10  182 0.32 Oil and Gas Extraction 211  805 3.23  2,474 4.30 Mining (except Oil and Gas) 212  251 1.01  1,845 3.20 Support Activities for Mining 213  284 1.14  517 0.90 Heavy and Civil Engineering Construction 237  147 0.59  434 0.75 Specialty Trade Contractors 238  66 0.27  187 0.32 Food Manufacturing 311  492 1.98  1,037 1.80 Beverage and Tobacco Product Manufacturing 312  209 0.84  528 0.92 Apparel Manufacturing 315  274 1.10  527 0.92 Leather and Allied Product Manufacturing 316  167 0.67  224 0.39 Wood Product Manufacturing 321  99 0.40  193 0.34 Paper Manufacturing 322  240 0.96  507 0.88 Printing and Related Support Activities 323  141 0.57  198 0.34 Petroleum and Coal Products Manufacturing 324  173 0.69  548 0.95 Chemical Manufacturing 325  3,037 12.20  7,725 13.41 Plastics and Rubber Products Manufacturing 326  226 0.91  519 0.90 Nonmetallic Mineral Product Manufacturing 327  159 0.64  346 0.60 Primary Metal Manufacturing 331  327 1.31  791 1.37 Fabricated Metal Product Manufacturing 332  467 1.88  736 1.28 Machinery Manufacturing 333  1,210 4.86  2,196 3.81 Computer and Electronic Product Manufacturing 334  4,068 16.34  7,971 13.84 Electrical Equipment, Appliance, and Component Manufacturing 335  582 2.34  1,092 1.90 Transportation Equipment Manufacturing 336  713 2.86  1,544 2.68 Furniture and Related Product Manufacturing 337  184 0.74  259 0.45 Miscellaneous Manufacturing 339  925 3.71  1,843 3.20 
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Table 2: Industry Detail (Cont.) Three-digit NAICS 
 (1)  (2)   Sample  Compustat   N %  N %         Merchant Wholesalers, Durable Goods 423  628 2.52  1,230 2.14 Merchant Wholesalers, Nondurable Goods 424  320 1.29  846 1.47 Motor Vehicle and Parts Dealers 441  149 0.60  205 0.36 Electronics and Appliance Stores 443  8 0.03  119 0.21 Food and Beverage Stores 445  114 0.46  257 0.45 Health and Personal Care Stores 446  106 0.43  241 0.42 Clothing and Clothing Accessories Stores 448  423 1.70  603 1.05 Sporting Goods, Hobby, Musical Instrument, and Book Stores 451  91 0.37  195 0.34 General Merchandise Stores 452  190 0.76  261 0.45 Miscellaneous Store Retailers 453  61 0.24  138 0.24 Nonstore Retailers 454  187 0.75  515 0.89 Air Transportation 481  157 0.63  399 0.69 Rail Transportation 482  7 0.03  108 0.19 Water Transportation 483  100 0.40  649 1.13 Truck Transportation 484  198 0.80  258 0.45 Publishing Industries (except Internet) 511  1,379 5.54  3,457 6.00 Motion Picture and Sound Recording Industries 512  85 0.34  391 0.68 Broadcasting (except Internet) 515  311 1.25  641 1.11 Telecommunications 517  554 2.22  2,038 3.54 Data Processing, Hosting, and Related Services 518  357 1.43  881 1.53 Other Information Services 519  332 1.33  1,369 2.38 Rental and Leasing Services 532  83 0.33  426 0.74 Professional, Scientific, and Technical Services 541  1,513 6.08  3,392 5.89 Administrative and Support Services 561  593 2.38  1,132 1.97 Educational Services 611  152 0.61  363 0.63 
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Table 2: Industry Detail (Cont.) Three-digit NAICS 
 (1)  (2)   Sample  Compustat   N %  N %         Ambulatory Health Care Services 621  438 1.76  810 1.41 Hospitals 622  98 0.39  206 0.36 Nursing and Residential Care Facilities 623  113 0.45  164 0.28 Amusement, Gambling, and Recreation Industries 713  158 0.63  415 0.72 Accommodation 721  151 0.61  379 0.66 Food Services and Drinking Places 722  476 1.91  901 1.56 Personal and Laundry Services 812  97 0.39  177 0.31           Total   24,900 100.00       57,589  100.00 This table presents the distribution of sample observations across three-digit NAICS industries and the distribution of all Compustat observations with non-missing NAICS industry identifiers for comparison.   
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Table 3: Descriptive Statistics    
       Variables (N = 24,900) Mean Std   0.25 Mdn 0.75 
       Ret -0.1492 0.6123  -0.3757 -0.0683 0.2165 Vol 0.0335 0.0196  0.0207 0.0285 0.0404 Zscore 0.3246 4.9627  -1.3936 -0.6161 0.4509 Lev 0.4955 0.2891  0.2883 0.4686 0.6442 Dev Ret -0.1515 0.9836  -0.5836 -0.0020 0.4596 Dev Vol 0.2024 0.9358  -0.4035 0.0000 0.5569 Dev ZScore 0.0014 0.3355  -0.0329 -0.0064 0.0218 Dev Lev -0.0079 0.3715  -0.0301 -0.0015 0.0121 Trc Dev Ret 0.3333 0.4714  0 0 1 Trc Dev Vol 0.3333 0.4714  0 0 1 Trc Dev ZScore 0.3333 0.4714  0 0 1 Trc Dev Lev 0.3333 0.4714  0 0 1 Count Trc Dev 1.3333 1.1617  0 1 2 Fees 1,800,000 2,500,000  400,000 900,000 2,000,000 Ln Fees 13.6971 1.2037  12.8783 13.7086 14.4876 Misstate 0.0449 0.2072  0 0 0 AT 3,300 13,000  101 405 1,700 Ln AT 6.0850 1.9853  4.6278 6.0075 7.4317 Rev 2,700 7,700  82 390 1,600 Ln Rev 5.8630 2.2145  4.4204 5.9676 7.3784 Curr 3.0406 3.1340  1.4394 2.1519 3.4679 FCF -0.0326 0.7232  -0.0702 0.0807 0.2031 CF Vol 89.2344 393.0833  4.9345 15.1388 50.8670 Rev Vol 283.4327 907.3932  10.5615 44.2697 172.5905 Seg 4.8752 2.8242  2 4 6 Ln Seg 1.4255 0.5638  0.6931 1.3863 1.7918 Foreign 0.4985 0.5000  0 0 1 Loss 0.3320 0.4709  0 0 1 GCO 0.0281 0.1653  0 0 0 Busy 0.6697 0.4703  0 1 1 BigN 0.7398 0.4388  0 1 1 Merge 0.1111 0.3142  0 0 0 Mat Weak 0.0727 0.2596  0 0 0 Ind Herf 0.0712 0.0572  0.0291 0.0570 0.0872 Au Herf 0.2588 0.0497  0.2288 0.2481 0.2669 CLead 0.5578 0.4967  0 1 1 Short Ten 0.1936 0.3951  0 0 0 
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Table 3: Descriptive Statistics (Cont.)  
All variables are as defined in Appendix A. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels.   
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Table 4: Correlations                      Variables 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12.              1. Ret 1            2. Vol 0.21 1           3. Zscore 0.12 0.38 1          4. Lev -0.05 0.05 0.14 1         5. Dev Ret 0.82 0.15 0.15 -0.03 1        6. Dev Vol 0.09 0.80 0.38 0.06 0.15 1       7. Dev ZScore 0.07 0.23 0.38 0.11 0.12 0.29 1      8. Dev Lev -0.02 0.05 0.06 0.48 -0.01 0.05 0.19 1     9. Trc Dev Ret 0.54 0.26 0.20 -0.02 0.66 0.28 0.15 0.01 1    10. Trc Dev Vol 0.04 0.62 0.31 0.04 0.10 0.76 0.23 0.04 0.23 1   11. Trc Dev ZScore 0.12 0.40 0.46 0.13 0.18 0.46 0.40 0.11 0.25 0.42 1  12. Trc Dev Lev -0.02 0.03 0.06 0.67 -0.03 0.03 0.10 0.42 -0.01 0.03 0.12 1 13. Count Trc Dev 0.27 0.54 0.42 0.33 0.37 0.62 0.35 0.24 0.60 0.68 0.73 0.46 14. Ln Fees -0.01 -0.36 -0.22 0.27 -0.02 -0.42 -0.09 0.13 -0.14 -0.36 -0.23 0.23 15. Misstate 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.00 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.02 16. Ln AT -0.04 -0.45 -0.35 0.28 -0.05 -0.50 -0.17 0.11 -0.18 -0.43 -0.34 0.23 17. Ln Rev -0.05 -0.45 -0.41 0.28 -0.06 -0.47 -0.16 0.10 -0.19 -0.41 -0.33 0.23 18. Curr 0.00 0.03 -0.06 -0.44 -0.01 0.01 -0.07 -0.13 0.02 0.02 -0.07 -0.26 19. FCF -0.11 -0.31 -0.52 -0.06 -0.13 -0.29 -0.22 -0.02 -0.16 -0.22 -0.27 -0.04 20. CF Vol -0.01 -0.12 -0.06 0.07 -0.01 -0.14 -0.02 0.03 -0.05 -0.11 -0.07 0.04 21. Rev Vol -0.01 -0.16 -0.07 0.12 -0.02 -0.17 -0.02 0.07 -0.08 -0.14 -0.06 0.11 22. Ln Seg -0.02 -0.20 -0.18 0.00 -0.03 -0.22 -0.05 0.03 -0.09 -0.19 -0.19 0.04    
  
59 
Table 4: Correlations (Cont.)                       Variables 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12.              23. Foreign -0.02 -0.21 -0.17 0.01 -0.03 -0.24 -0.06 0.06 -0.09 -0.21 -0.20 0.04 24. Loss 0.16 0.43 0.43 0.04 0.21 0.44 0.29 0.06 0.28 0.40 0.57 0.04 25. GCO 0.10 0.33 0.43 0.13 0.12 0.34 0.19 0.07 0.14 0.22 0.22 0.07 26. Busy -0.02 0.03 0.06 0.10 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.04 -0.01 0.01 0.02 0.06 27. BigN -0.02 -0.27 -0.12 0.15 -0.03 -0.31 -0.09 0.07 -0.10 -0.26 -0.16 0.12 28. Merge 0.00 -0.06 -0.05 0.08 -0.01 -0.06 -0.01 0.07 -0.02 -0.06 -0.07 0.07 29. Mat Weak 0.05 0.10 0.06 0.02 0.06 0.14 0.05 0.01 0.09 0.11 0.09 0.01 30. Ind Herf -0.01 -0.06 -0.09 0.08 0.01 0.00 -0.02 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.03 0.03 31. Au Herf -0.05 -0.12 -0.06 0.12 0.01 0.00 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.04 32. CLead -0.01 -0.17 -0.10 0.14 0.00 -0.17 -0.04 0.05 -0.05 -0.15 -0.08 0.12 33. Short Ten 0.00 0.14 0.06 -0.03 0.01 0.17 0.05 -0.01 0.05 0.14 0.09 -0.03    
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Table 4: Correlations (Cont.)                       Variables 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24.              13. Count Trc Dev 1            14. Ln Fees -0.20 1           15. Misstate 0.04 -0.01 1          16. Ln AT -0.29 0.87 -0.02 1         17. Ln Rev -0.28 0.81 -0.02 0.91 1        18. Curr -0.11 -0.27 -0.02 -0.26 -0.38 1       19. FCF -0.28 0.20 -0.01 0.23 0.34 0.01 1      20. CF Vol -0.08 0.32 -0.02 0.39 0.33 -0.08 0.06 1     21. Rev Vol -0.07 0.42 -0.02 0.49 0.47 -0.12 0.07 0.50 1    22. Ln Seg -0.17 0.44 0.00 0.35 0.37 -0.10 0.17 0.13 0.16 1   23. Foreign -0.19 0.49 -0.03 0.37 0.37 -0.09 0.16 0.12 0.14 0.52 1  24. Loss 0.52 -0.24 0.02 -0.36 -0.45 0.10 -0.29 -0.09 -0.13 -0.19 -0.16 1 25. GCO 0.26 -0.13 -0.01 -0.20 -0.22 -0.06 -0.30 -0.03 -0.04 -0.08 -0.10 0.22 26. Busy 0.04 0.07 -0.02 0.06 -0.02 -0.01 -0.06 0.03 0.03 -0.04 -0.02 0.07 27. BigN -0.16 0.57 0.01 0.52 0.46 -0.10 0.13 0.12 0.17 0.17 0.23 -0.16 28. Merge -0.03 0.09 0.01 0.08 0.07 -0.07 0.06 0.00 0.03 0.07 0.05 -0.05 29. Mat Weak 0.12 -0.01 0.10 -0.11 -0.09 -0.02 -0.04 -0.04 -0.05 0.00 -0.02 0.10 30. Ind Herf 0.02 0.05 -0.01 0.11 0.20 -0.14 0.09 0.01 0.07 -0.08 -0.09 -0.11 31. Au Herf 0.01 0.07 0.00 0.14 0.18 -0.08 0.09 0.07 0.09 0.00 -0.07 -0.08 32. CLead -0.07 0.33 0.00 0.35 0.35 -0.12 0.11 0.11 0.15 0.09 0.07 -0.13 33. Short Ten 0.10 -0.24 0.03 -0.23 -0.21 0.03 -0.07 -0.06 -0.07 -0.07 -0.10 0.09    
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Table 4: Correlations (Cont.)                       Variables 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33.                 25. GCO 1            26. Busy 0.02 1           27. BigN -0.11 0.07 1          28. Merge -0.04 0.02 0.04 1         29. Mat Weak 0.07 -0.02 -0.09 0.01 1        30. Ind Herf -0.04 -0.04 0.01 0.01 -0.01 1       31. Au Herf -0.02 0.04 0.09 -0.01 -0.01 0.38 1      32. CLead -0.06 0.03 0.37 0.01 -0.03 0.19 0.20 1     33. Short Ten 0.07 0.00 -0.32 0.00 0.11 -0.01 -0.01 -0.15 1    All variables are as defined in Appendix A. This table presents Pearson's pairwise correlation coefficients. Bold indicates significance at the 0.10 level or below. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels.   
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Table 5: Ln Fees       
 (1) (2) (3)  
Continuous 
 Top Tercile Ind 
 Top Tercile Count 
 
Variables t t t               Ret -0.004 (-0.324) -0.002 (-0.242) -0.018*** (-3.030) Vol -0.160 (-0.320) -0.986*** (-2.726) -1.101*** (-3.259) Zscore 0.020*** (9.038) 0.019*** (9.308) 0.020*** (9.505) Lev 0.044 (1.553) 0.037 (1.232) 0.014 (0.528) 
       Dev Ret 0.001 (0.093)     Dev Vol -0.003 (-0.310)     Dev ZScore 0.047*** (2.616)     Dev Lev 0.020 (1.138)     Trc Dev Ret   -0.003 (-0.396)   Trc Dev Vol   0.026** (2.267)   Trc Dev ZScore   0.108*** (7.721)   Trc Dev Lev   0.006 (0.466)   Count Trc Dev     0.035*** (6.130)        Ln AT 0.368*** (35.572) 0.372*** (35.998) 0.370*** (35.775) Ln Rev 0.119*** (11.903) 0.121*** (12.263) 0.120*** (12.095) Curr -0.004* (-1.808) -0.003 (-1.185) -0.004 (-1.626) FCF -0.000 (-0.036) -0.001 (-0.097) -0.001 (-0.089) CF Vol -0.000*** (-4.168) -0.000*** (-4.064) -0.000*** (-4.083) Rev Vol 0.000 (1.291) 0.000 (0.666) 0.000 (1.084) Ln Seg 0.154*** (10.395) 0.155*** (10.491) 0.155*** (10.440) Foreign 0.253*** (15.079) 0.255*** (15.223) 0.255*** (15.202) Loss 0.167*** (14.003) 0.124*** (10.638) 0.149*** (12.820) 
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Table 5: Ln Fees (Cont.)       
 (1) (2) (3)  
Continuous 
 Top Tercile Ind 
 Top Tercile Count 
 
Variables t t t        GCO 0.077*** (2.671) 0.095*** (3.319) 0.089*** (3.083) Busy 0.075*** (4.690) 0.075*** (4.664) 0.075*** (4.689) BigN 0.388*** (20.122) 0.385*** (20.070) 0.387*** (20.121) Merge 0.029** (2.371) 0.035*** (2.891) 0.032*** (2.582) Mat Weak 0.332*** (17.615) 0.331*** (17.588) 0.330*** (17.516) Ind Herf -0.569*** (-2.790) -0.583*** (-2.874) -0.564*** (-2.774) Au Herf -0.043 (-0.319) -0.048 (-0.354) -0.047 (-0.349) CLead 0.041*** (3.057) 0.041*** (3.097) 0.041*** (3.095) Short Ten -0.030** (-2.542) -0.031*** (-2.608) -0.031*** (-2.625) Constant 9.865*** (63.737) 9.811*** (64.031) 9.833*** (64.245) 




Table 6: Misstate       
 (1) (2) (3)  
Continuous 
 Top Tercile Ind 
 Top Tercile Count 
 
Variables z z z               Ret -0.022 (-0.145) -0.116* (-1.661) -0.112* (-1.891) Vol 9.911** (1.969) 8.733*** (2.874) 9.119*** (3.165) Zscore -0.004 (-0.341) -0.005 (-0.448) -0.005 (-0.393) Lev 0.546*** (2.980) 0.554*** (3.243) 0.496*** (3.077) 
       Dev Ret -0.032 (-0.377)     Dev Vol 0.023 (0.259)     Dev ZScore 0.041 (0.215)     Dev Lev 0.057 (0.449)     Trc Dev Ret   0.089 (1.004)   Trc Dev Vol   0.104 (1.021)   Trc Dev ZScore   0.103 (0.883)   Trc Dev Lev   0.018 (0.173)   Count Trc Dev     0.080* (1.734)        Ln AT 0.152** (1.998) 0.159** (2.084) 0.155** (2.047) Ln Rev -0.056 (-0.795) -0.054 (-0.784) -0.055 (-0.799) Curr 0.000 (0.009) 0.002 (0.134) 0.002 (0.124) FCF -0.082* (-1.804) -0.083* (-1.837) -0.083* (-1.831) CF Vol -0.000 (-0.848) -0.000 (-0.850) -0.000 (-0.840) Rev Vol -0.000 (-0.883) -0.000 (-0.905) -0.000 (-0.904) Ln Seg 0.235** (2.100) 0.236** (2.103) 0.236** (2.097) Foreign -0.221** (-1.973) -0.218* (-1.947) -0.217* (-1.937) Loss 0.097 (0.980) 0.034 (0.321) 0.044 (0.454) 
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Table 6: Misstate (Cont.)       
 (1) (2) (3)  
Continuous 
 Top Tercile Ind 
 Top Tercile Count 
 
Variables z z z               GCO -1.114*** (-4.287) -1.069*** (-4.156) -1.072*** (-4.191) Busy -0.199* (-1.818) -0.202* (-1.845) -0.202* (-1.848) BigN -0.083 (-0.637) -0.085 (-0.650) -0.083 (-0.633) Merge 0.031 (0.300) 0.039 (0.374) 0.036 (0.343) Mat Weak 0.791*** (8.166) 0.783*** (8.077) 0.784*** (8.099) Ind Herf 0.138 (0.065) 0.222 (0.104) 0.212 (0.100) Au Herf -1.456 (-1.013) -1.502 (-1.037) -1.486 (-1.023) CLead 0.031 (0.301) 0.031 (0.307) 0.031 (0.303) Short Ten -0.131 (-1.361) -0.132 (-1.364) -0.131 (-1.358) Constant -2.808** (-2.127) -2.937** (-2.226) -2.908** (-2.215) 




Table 7: Ln Fees with BigN Interactions      Panel A: Regression Output (1) (2) (3) 
 
Continuous 
 Top Tercile Ind 
 Top Tercile Count 
 
Variables t t t               Ret -0.001 (-0.080) 0.000 (0.029) -0.015** (-2.531) Vol -0.185 (-0.368) -0.720** (-2.014) -0.884*** (-2.644) Zscore 0.020*** (8.994) 0.019*** (9.273) 0.020*** (9.501) Lev 0.043 (1.514) 0.045 (1.499) 0.015 (0.559) 
       Dev Ret 0.002 (0.207)     Dev Vol -0.042*** (-3.335)     Dev ZScore 0.047 (1.452)     Dev Lev -0.065* (-1.810)     Trc Dev Ret   -0.022 (-1.509)   Trc Dev Vol   -0.050** (-2.343)   Trc Dev ZScore   0.116*** (4.665)   Trc Dev Lev   -0.098*** (-3.590)   Count Trc Dev     -0.005 (-0.512)        BigN*Dev Ret -0.003 (-0.482)     BigN*Dev Vol 0.072*** (5.878)     BigN*Dev ZScore 0.002 (0.057)     BigN*Dev Lev 0.112*** (3.006)     BigN*Trc Dev Ret   0.024 (1.541)   BigN*Trc Dev Vol   0.106*** (4.539)   BigN*Trc Dev ZScore   -0.012 (-0.464)   BigN*Trc Dev Lev   0.128*** (4.572)   BigN*Count Trc Dev     0.053*** (5.038) 
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Table 7: Ln Fees with BigN Interactions (Cont.)     Panel A: Regression Output (1) (2) (3) 
 
Continuous 
 Top Tercile Ind 
 Top Tercile Count 
 
Variables t t t               Ln AT 0.371*** (36.039) 0.373*** (36.106) 0.371*** (35.872) Ln Rev 0.120*** (12.009) 0.121*** (12.253) 0.120*** (12.061) Curr -0.005** (-2.006) -0.003 (-1.439) -0.004* (-1.867) FCF -0.002 (-0.207) -0.001 (-0.159) -0.001 (-0.127) CF Vol -0.000*** (-3.963) -0.000*** (-3.903) -0.000*** (-3.992) Rev Vol 0.000 (1.405) 0.000 (0.701) 0.000 (1.120) Ln Seg 0.156*** (10.566) 0.156*** (10.594) 0.156*** (10.562) Foreign 0.252*** (15.087) 0.255*** (15.277) 0.256*** (15.250) Loss 0.163*** (13.707) 0.124*** (10.583) 0.151*** (12.959) GCO 0.095*** (3.289) 0.106*** (3.676) 0.098*** (3.417) Busy 0.074*** (4.625) 0.074*** (4.627) 0.074*** (4.665) BigN 0.357*** (17.070) 0.301*** (11.340) 0.306*** (11.525) Merge 0.027** (2.256) 0.036*** (2.961) 0.031** (2.563) Mat Weak 0.336*** (18.063) 0.334*** (17.868) 0.331*** (17.666) Ind Herf -0.557*** (-2.733) -0.572*** (-2.821) -0.556*** (-2.726) Au Herf -0.052 (-0.389) -0.056 (-0.417) -0.057 (-0.424) CLead 0.039*** (2.939) 0.041*** (3.085) 0.041*** (3.059) Short Ten -0.030** (-2.508) -0.030** (-2.550) -0.029** (-2.470) Constant 9.870*** (62.660) 9.875*** (65.282) 9.884*** (64.251) 
       Observations 24,900 24,900 24,900 Adjusted R-squared 0.848 0.849 0.848 Industry FE/Year FE Yes/Yes Yes/Yes Yes/Yes   
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Table 7: Ln Fees with BigN Interactions (Cont.)     Panel B: Joint Tests              Variables         F p 




Table 8: Misstate with BigN Interactions      Panel A: Regression Output (1) (2) (3) 
 
Continuous 
 Top Tercile Ind 
 Top Tercile Count 
 
Variables z z z               Ret -0.023 (-0.150) -0.119* (-1.691) -0.116* (-1.955) Vol 9.963** (1.976) 8.690*** (2.817) 8.832*** (3.009) Zscore -0.004 (-0.343) -0.006 (-0.485) -0.005 (-0.429) Lev 0.550*** (2.988) 0.536*** (3.141) 0.492*** (3.052) 
       Dev Ret -0.018 (-0.185)     Dev Vol -0.041 (-0.389)     Dev ZScore 0.231 (1.486)     Dev Lev 0.425** (2.176)     Trc Dev Ret   0.076 (0.539)   Trc Dev Vol   -0.073 (-0.409)   Trc Dev ZScore   0.308 (1.584)   Trc Dev Lev   0.239 (1.291)   Count Trc Dev     0.135 (1.637) BigN*Dev Ret -0.018 (-0.286)     BigN*Dev Vol 0.111 (1.344)     BigN*Dev ZScore -0.322 (-1.134)     BigN*Dev Lev -0.504** (-2.327)     BigN*Trc Dev Ret   0.019 (0.128)   BigN*Trc Dev Vol   0.244 (1.220)   BigN*Trc Dev ZScore   -0.277 (-1.279)   BigN*Trc Dev Lev   -0.277 (-1.342)   BigN*Count Trc Dev     -0.069 (-0.814)        
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Table 8: Misstate with BigN Interactions (Cont.)     Panel A: Regression Output (1) (2) (3) 
 
Continuous 
 Top Tercile Ind 
 Top Tercile Count 
 
Variables z z z        Ln AT 0.157** (2.057) 0.158** (2.076) 0.153** (2.022) Ln Rev -0.055 (-0.774) -0.053 (-0.753) -0.055 (-0.790) Curr 0.000 (0.016) 0.004 (0.218) 0.003 (0.167) FCF -0.079* (-1.701) -0.083* (-1.834) -0.082* (-1.816) CF Vol -0.000 (-0.846) -0.000 (-0.857) -0.000 (-0.845) Rev Vol -0.000 (-0.845) -0.000 (-0.875) -0.000 (-0.908) Ln Seg 0.234** (2.093) 0.231** (2.060) 0.234** (2.080) Foreign -0.222** (-1.983) -0.219** (-1.960) -0.218* (-1.940) Loss 0.095 (0.960) 0.030 (0.285) 0.044 (0.451) GCO -1.189*** (-4.259) -1.092*** (-4.194) -1.085*** (-4.218) Busy -0.201* (-1.836) -0.199* (-1.813) -0.201* (-1.839) BigN -0.144 (-0.984) -0.003 (-0.014) 0.040 (0.193) Merge 0.029 (0.279) 0.036 (0.349) 0.036 (0.342) Mat Weak 0.790*** (8.144) 0.785*** (8.096) 0.784*** (8.101) Ind Herf 0.051 (0.024) 0.179 (0.084) 0.196 (0.092) Au Herf -1.434 (-0.994) -1.499 (-1.036) -1.480 (-1.020) CLead 0.033 (0.329) 0.036 (0.352) 0.032 (0.317) Short Ten -0.128 (-1.333) -0.133 (-1.376) -0.133 (-1.375) Constant -2.771** (-2.095) -2.970** (-2.242) -2.978** (-2.267) 
       Observations 24,900 24,900 24,900 Pseudo R-squared 0.109 0.109 0.108 Area under ROC 0.756 0.756 0.755 Industry FE/Year FE Yes/Yes Yes/Yes Yes/Yes 
  
71 
Table 8: Misstate with BigN Interactions (Cont.)     Panel B: Joint Tests       
       Variables         χ2 p 




Table 9: Ln Fees with CLead Interactions     Panel A: Regression Output (1) (2) (3) 
 
Continuous 
 Top Tercile Ind 
 Top Tercile Count 
 
Variables t t t               Ret -0.004 (-0.327) -0.002 (-0.227) -0.017*** (-2.881) Vol -0.084 (-0.168) -0.934*** (-2.584) -1.042*** (-3.084) Zscore 0.020*** (9.296) 0.019*** (9.389) 0.020*** (9.580) Lev 0.044 (1.562) 0.041 (1.361) 0.014 (0.519) 
       Dev Ret 0.003 (0.427)     Dev Vol -0.016 (-1.433)     Dev ZScore 0.016 (0.476)     Dev Lev 0.035 (1.022)     Trc Dev Ret   -0.005 (-0.456)   Trc Dev Vol   0.007 (0.417)   Trc Dev ZScore   0.106*** (5.688)   Trc Dev Lev   -0.037** (-1.963)   Count Trc Dev     0.021*** (2.867) CLead*Dev Ret -0.005 (-0.849)     CLead*Dev Vol 0.025** (2.291)     CLead*Dev ZScore 0.043 (1.135)     CLead*Dev Lev -0.022 (-0.598)     CLead*Trc Dev Ret   0.002 (0.178)   CLead*Trc Dev Vol   0.036* (1.820)   CLead*Trc Dev ZScore   0.004 (0.184)   CLead*Trc Dev Lev   0.069*** (3.199)   CLead*Count Trc Dev     0.024*** (2.907)   
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Table 9: Ln Fees with CLead Interactions (Cont.)     Panel A: Regression Output (1) (2) (3) 
 
Continuous 
 Top Tercile Ind 
 Top Tercile Count 
 
Variables t t t        Ln AT 0.370*** (35.743) 0.373*** (35.994) 0.371*** (35.849) Ln Rev 0.119*** (11.870) 0.121*** (12.178) 0.120*** (11.998) Curr -0.004* (-1.849) -0.003 (-1.347) -0.004* (-1.767) FCF -0.001 (-0.064) -0.001 (-0.166) -0.001 (-0.107) CF Vol -0.000*** (-4.072) -0.000*** (-3.967) -0.000*** (-4.018) Rev Vol 0.000 (1.421) 0.000 (0.607) 0.000 (1.126) Ln Seg 0.155*** (10.436) 0.156*** (10.556) 0.155*** (10.474) Foreign 0.253*** (15.072) 0.254*** (15.196) 0.255*** (15.193) Loss 0.166*** (13.995) 0.124*** (10.594) 0.149*** (12.830) GCO 0.079*** (2.721) 0.096*** (3.339) 0.090*** (3.114) Busy 0.075*** (4.711) 0.075*** (4.671) 0.075*** (4.709) BigN 0.383*** (19.726) 0.385*** (19.901) 0.385*** (19.971) Merge 0.028** (2.333) 0.035*** (2.844) 0.031** (2.529) Mat Weak 0.332*** (17.620) 0.331*** (17.643) 0.330*** (17.532) Ind Herf -0.560*** (-2.737) -0.598*** (-2.941) -0.568*** (-2.789) Au Herf -0.049 (-0.366) -0.041 (-0.302) -0.048 (-0.357) CLead 0.034** (2.514) 0.006 (0.344) 0.010 (0.589) Short Ten -0.031*** (-2.578) -0.031** (-2.576) -0.031*** (-2.581) Constant 9.862*** (63.170) 9.828*** (63.760) 9.849*** (64.078) 
       Observations 24,900 24,900 24,900 Adjusted R-squared 0.847 0.848 0.847 Industry FE/Year FE Yes/Yes Yes/Yes Yes/Yes  
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Table 9: Ln Fees with CLead Interactions (Cont.)     Panel B: Joint Tests       
       Variables         F p 




Table 10: Misstate with CLead Interactions Panel A: Regression Output (1) (2) (3) 
 Continuous  Top Tercile Ind  Top Tercile Count  Variables z z z               Ret -0.019 (-0.122) -0.116* (-1.648) -0.116* (-1.955) Vol 10.168** (2.026) 8.711*** (2.852) 8.832*** (3.009) Zscore -0.002 (-0.167) -0.005 (-0.426) -0.005 (-0.429) Lev 0.525*** (2.860) 0.542*** (3.162) 0.492*** (3.052) 
       Dev Ret -0.047 (-0.520)     Dev Vol -0.000 (-0.002)     Dev ZScore -0.047 (-0.169)     Dev Lev 0.430** (2.017)     Trc Dev Ret   0.096 (0.803)   Trc Dev Vol   0.078 (0.549)   Trc Dev ZScore   0.060 (0.378)   Trc Dev Lev   0.176 (1.239)   Count Trc Dev     0.092 (1.462) CLead*Dev Ret -0.018 (-0.286)     CLead*Dev Vol 0.111 (1.344)     CLead*Dev ZScore -0.322 (-1.134)     CLead*Dev Lev -0.504** (-2.327)     CLead*Trc Dev Ret   0.019 (0.128)   CLead*Trc Dev Vol   0.244 (1.220)   CLead*Trc Dev ZScore   -0.277 (-1.279)   CLead*Trc Dev Lev   -0.277 (-1.342)   CLead*Count Trc Dev     -0.020 (-0.305)        
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Table 10: Misstate with CLead Interactions (Cont.)  Panel A: Regression Output (1) (2) (3) 
 Continuous  Top Tercile Ind  Top Tercile Count  Variables z z z        Ln AT 0.151** (1.977) 0.160** (2.092) 0.154** (2.028) Ln Rev -0.055 (-0.783) -0.055 (-0.792) -0.055 (-0.783) Curr 0.001 (0.044) 0.003 (0.172) 0.002 (0.144) FCF -0.082* (-1.791) -0.081* (-1.792) -0.083* (-1.827) CF Vol -0.000 (-0.838) -0.000 (-0.847) -0.000 (-0.841) Rev Vol -0.000 (-0.853) -0.000 (-0.875) -0.000 (-0.909) Ln Seg 0.235** (2.101) 0.235** (2.088) 0.235** (2.088) Foreign -0.217* (-1.946) -0.217* (-1.936) -0.217* (-1.935) Loss 0.093 (0.935) 0.037 (0.353) 0.044 (0.456) GCO -1.112*** (-4.262) -1.071*** (-4.156) -1.073*** (-4.195) Busy -0.201* (-1.835) -0.200* (-1.824) -0.202* (-1.849) BigN -0.088 (-0.672) -0.095 (-0.724) -0.080 (-0.613) Merge 0.028 (0.268) 0.041 (0.390) 0.036 (0.346) Mat Weak 0.789*** (8.136) 0.783*** (8.068) 0.785*** (8.104) Ind Herf 0.183 (0.086) 0.256 (0.120) 0.214 (0.101) Au Herf -1.512 (-1.052) -1.521 (-1.051) -1.487 (-1.024) CLead 0.025 (0.236) 0.086 (0.590) 0.061 (0.417) Short Ten -0.130 (-1.350) -0.131 (-1.353) -0.132 (-1.362) Constant -2.797** (-2.150) -2.964** (-2.253) -2.925** (-2.231) 
       Observations 24,900 24,900 24,900 Pseudo R-squared 0.108 0.108 0.108 Area under ROC 0.756 0.756 0.755 Industry FE/Year FE Yes/Yes Yes/Yes Yes/Yes 
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Table 10: Misstate with CLead Interactions (Cont.) Panel B: Joint Tests       
       Variables         χ2 p 




Table 11: Ln Fees (Using Pct Var)     
 (1) (2) (3)  
Continuous 
 Top Tercile Ind 
 Top Tercile Count 
 
Variables t t t               Ret -0.002 (-0.417) -0.000 (-0.053) -0.016*** (-2.813) Vol 0.499 (0.868) -0.910** (-2.499) -0.981*** (-2.928) Zscore 0.019*** (8.677) 0.019*** (9.362) 0.020*** (9.524) Lev 0.004 (0.057) 0.025 (0.795) 0.015 (0.571) 
       Pct Ret -0.000 (-0.253)     Pct Vol -0.030 (-1.429)     Pct ZScore 0.001*** (3.471)     Pct Lev 0.032 (0.942)     Trc Pct Ret   -0.006 (-0.653)   Trc Pct Vol   0.023** (1.989)   Trc Pct ZScore   0.095*** (6.541)   Trc Pct Lev   0.017 (1.152)   Count Trc Pct     0.032*** (5.444)        Ln AT 0.368*** (35.478) 0.373*** (36.011) 0.370*** (35.818) Ln Rev 0.120*** (11.985) 0.120*** (12.092) 0.120*** (12.030) Curr -0.003 (-1.458) -0.003 (-1.242) -0.004 (-1.605) FCF -0.001 (-0.160) -0.000 (-0.022) -0.001 (-0.080) CF Vol -0.000*** (-4.239) -0.000*** (-4.135) -0.000*** (-4.106) Rev Vol 0.000 (1.314) 0.000 (0.773) 0.000 (1.156) Ln Seg 0.154*** (10.376) 0.155*** (10.439) 0.155*** (10.442) Foreign 0.254*** (15.154) 0.254*** (15.206) 0.255*** (15.201) Loss 0.166*** (14.444) 0.126*** (10.386) 0.150*** (12.731) 
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Table 11: Ln Fees (Using Pct Var) (Cont.)     
 (1) (2) (3)  
Continuous 
 Top Tercile Ind 
 Top Tercile Count 
 
Variables t t t        GCO 0.078*** (2.704) 0.094*** (3.280) 0.088*** (3.067) Busy 0.075*** (4.685) 0.075*** (4.676) 0.075*** (4.712) BigN 0.387*** (20.066) 0.387*** (20.101) 0.388*** (20.111) Merge 0.030** (2.443) 0.034*** (2.767) 0.031** (2.561) Mat Weak 0.333*** (17.678) 0.331*** (17.610) 0.330*** (17.509) Ind Herf -0.567*** (-2.774) -0.570*** (-2.816) -0.566*** (-2.782) Au Herf -0.040 (-0.297) -0.049 (-0.367) -0.050 (-0.373) CLead 0.042*** (3.128) 0.041*** (3.078) 0.041*** (3.079) Short Ten -0.031** (-2.564) -0.031*** (-2.613) -0.031*** (-2.605) Constant 9.857*** (64.402) 9.822*** (64.149) 9.838*** (64.546) 




Table 12: Misstate (Using Pct Var)     
 (1) (2) (3)  
Continuous 
 Top Tercile Ind 
 Top Tercile Count 
 
Variables z z z               Ret -0.074 (-1.143) -0.125* (-1.839) -0.122** (-2.070) Vol 11.209* (1.957) 9.179*** (3.030) 8.829*** (3.066) Zscore 0.001 (0.054) -0.004 (-0.300) -0.005 (-0.389) Lev 0.421 (1.076) 0.402** (2.158) 0.465*** (2.818) 
       Pct Ret -0.000 (-0.042)     Pct Vol -0.006 (-0.035)     Pct ZScore -0.002 (-0.729)     Pct Lev 0.103 (0.447)     Trc Pct Ret   0.107 (1.253)   Trc Pct Vol   0.078 (0.760)   Trc Pct ZScore   0.057 (0.489)   Trc Pct Lev   0.163 (1.449)   Count Trc Pct     0.099** (2.067)        Ln AT 0.143* (1.869) 0.154** (2.025) 0.159** (2.090) Ln Rev -0.053 (-0.754) -0.058 (-0.841) -0.057 (-0.828) Curr 0.002 (0.137) 0.002 (0.120) 0.002 (0.146) FCF -0.080* (-1.762) -0.082* (-1.812) -0.082* (-1.815) CF Vol -0.000 (-0.843) -0.000 (-0.838) -0.000 (-0.848) Rev Vol -0.000 (-0.859) -0.000 (-0.884) -0.000 (-0.900) Ln Seg 0.236** (2.096) 0.236** (2.104) 0.236** (2.102) Foreign -0.218* (-1.949) -0.216* (-1.928) -0.217* (-1.940) Loss 0.111 (1.128) 0.046 (0.428) 0.027 (0.272) 
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Table 12: Misstate (Using Pct Var) (Cont.)     
 (1) (2) (3)  
Continuous 
 Top Tercile Ind 
 Top Tercile Count 
 
Variables z z z        GCO -1.105*** (-4.281) -1.068*** (-4.162) -1.061*** (-4.149) Busy -0.199* (-1.823) -0.202* (-1.845) -0.202* (-1.846) BigN -0.084 (-0.643) -0.079 (-0.606) -0.082 (-0.626) Merge 0.030 (0.289) 0.031 (0.302) 0.036 (0.350) Mat Weak 0.792*** (8.187) 0.784*** (8.095) 0.784*** (8.086) Ind Herf 0.256 (0.120) 0.204 (0.096) 0.194 (0.091) Au Herf -1.450 (-0.999) -1.468 (-1.012) -1.477 (-1.019) CLead 0.031 (0.303) 0.029 (0.284) 0.030 (0.291) Short Ten -0.130 (-1.350) -0.131 (-1.357) -0.132 (-1.365) Constant -2.802** (-2.103) -2.872** (-2.174) -2.910** (-2.214) 




Table 13: Ln Fees (Using Means) 
 (1) (2) (3)  Continuous  Top Tercile Ind  Top Tercile Count  Variables t t t               Ret -0.006 (-0.485) -0.004 (-0.606) -0.014** (-2.361) Vol -0.405 (-0.786) -0.866** (-2.386) -0.854** (-2.537) Zscore 0.020*** (8.978) 0.019*** (9.169) 0.020*** (9.423) Lev 0.047 (1.458) 0.055* (1.830) 0.028 (1.047) 
       Dev Ret (Mean) 0.002 (0.295)     Dev Vol (Mean) 0.002 (0.199)     Dev ZScore (Mean) 0.044** (2.417)     Dev Lev (Mean) 0.012 (0.626)     Trc Dev Ret (Mean)   0.004 (0.464)   Trc Dev Vol (Mean)   0.027** (2.433)   Trc Dev ZScore (Mean)   0.064*** (5.548)   Trc Dev Lev (Mean)   -0.001 (-0.104)   Count Trc Dev (Mean)     0.026*** (4.628)        Ln AT 0.369*** (35.569) 0.370*** (35.778) 0.368*** (35.709) Ln Rev 0.119*** (11.901) 0.121*** (12.168) 0.121*** (12.096) Curr -0.004* (-1.763) -0.003 (-1.435) -0.004* (-1.696) FCF -0.000 (-0.030) -0.001 (-0.164) -0.001 (-0.130) CF Vol -0.000*** (-4.163) -0.000*** (-4.277) -0.000*** (-4.152) Rev Vol 0.000 (1.298) 0.000 (1.033) 0.000 (1.183) Ln Seg 0.154*** (10.399) 0.154*** (10.417) 0.155*** (10.430) Foreign 0.253*** (15.079) 0.254*** (15.174) 0.254*** (15.167) Loss 0.167*** (14.028) 0.154*** (13.367) 0.160*** (13.767) 
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Table 13: Ln Fees (Using Means) (Cont.) 
 (1) (2) (3)  Continuous  Top Tercile Ind  Top Tercile Count  Variables t t t        GCO 0.077*** (2.673) 0.082*** (2.870) 0.083*** (2.870) Busy 0.075*** (4.687) 0.075*** (4.686) 0.075*** (4.678) BigN 0.388*** (20.128) 0.387*** (20.133) 0.387*** (20.113) Merge 0.029** (2.405) 0.032*** (2.603) 0.031** (2.502) Mat Weak 0.332*** (17.603) 0.332*** (17.630) 0.331*** (17.560) Ind Herf -0.561*** (-2.750) -0.529*** (-2.590) -0.555*** (-2.722) Au Herf -0.047 (-0.347) -0.063 (-0.468) -0.060 (-0.445) CLead 0.041*** (3.070) 0.042*** (3.110) 0.041*** (3.103) Short Ten -0.031** (-2.551) -0.031*** (-2.621) -0.031*** (-2.622) Constant 9.875*** (63.458) 9.828*** (63.979) 9.851*** (64.426) 




Table 14: Misstate (Using Means) 
 (1) (2) (3)  Continuous  Top Tercile Ind  Top Tercile Count  Variables z z z               Ret -0.017 (-0.104) -0.145** (-2.140) -0.103* (-1.758) Vol 9.822* (1.901) 8.669*** (2.847) 9.604*** (3.353) Zscore -0.005 (-0.421) -0.003 (-0.228) -0.005 (-0.388) Lev 0.513** (2.407) 0.586*** (3.337) 0.521*** (3.195) 
       Dev Ret (Mean) -0.035 (-0.405)     Dev Vol (Mean) 0.024 (0.261)     Dev ZScore (Mean) 0.078 (0.448)     Dev Lev (Mean) 0.075 (0.517)     Trc Dev Ret (Mean)   0.157* (1.823)   Trc Dev Vol (Mean)   0.115 (1.150)   Trc Dev ZScore (Mean)   -0.030 (-0.291)   Trc Dev Lev (Mean)   -0.001 (-0.010)   Count Trc Dev (Mean)     0.059 (1.287)        Ln AT 0.153** (2.016) 0.154** (2.032) 0.152** (2.001) Ln Rev -0.056 (-0.805) -0.055 (-0.786) -0.055 (-0.788) Curr 0.000 (0.003) 0.000 (0.028) 0.002 (0.092) FCF -0.081* (-1.782) -0.083* (-1.837) -0.083* (-1.845) CF Vol -0.000 (-0.849) -0.000 (-0.848) -0.000 (-0.841) Rev Vol -0.000 (-0.887) -0.000 (-0.871) -0.000 (-0.897) Ln Seg 0.235** (2.094) 0.238** (2.120) 0.236** (2.100) Foreign -0.222** (-1.981) -0.219* (-1.957) -0.218* (-1.948) Loss 0.094 (0.953) 0.076 (0.777) 0.070 (0.726) 
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Table 14: Misstate (Using Means) (Cont.) 
 (1) (2) (3)  Continuous  Top Tercile Ind  Top Tercile Count  Variables z z z        GCO -1.116*** (-4.287) -1.091*** (-4.199) -1.089*** (-4.223) Busy -0.199* (-1.816) -0.202* (-1.852) -0.202* (-1.848) BigN -0.082 (-0.629) -0.083 (-0.639) -0.082 (-0.630) Merge 0.031 (0.297) 0.035 (0.331) 0.035 (0.333) Mat Weak 0.791*** (8.165) 0.783*** (8.064) 0.788*** (8.135) Ind Herf 0.130 (0.061) 0.208 (0.098) 0.232 (0.109) Au Herf -1.459 (-1.013) -1.495 (-1.029) -1.498 (-1.028) CLead 0.030 (0.299) 0.030 (0.299) 0.031 (0.301) Short Ten -0.131 (-1.356) -0.133 (-1.377) -0.133 (-1.378) Constant -2.766** (-2.070) -2.877** (-2.175) -2.880** (-2.194) 




Table 15: Ln Fees with BigN-MidN Interactions Panel A: Regression Output (1) (2) (3) 
 Continuous  Top Tercile Ind  Top Tercile Count  Variables t t t               Ret -0.007 (-0.593) -0.003 (-0.449) -0.018*** (-3.158) Vol -0.227 (-0.463) -0.659* (-1.890) -0.759** (-2.321) Zscore 0.020*** (9.177) 0.019*** (9.436) 0.021*** (9.635) Lev 0.054* (1.903) 0.055* (1.827) 0.027 (1.002) 
       Dev Ret 0.002 (0.196)     Dev Vol -0.014 (-1.064)     Dev ZScore 0.046 (1.279)     Dev Lev -0.026 (-0.680)     Trc Dev Ret   -0.023 (-1.312)   Trc Dev Vol   -0.008 (-0.319)   Trc Dev ZScore   0.163*** (5.741)   Trc Dev Lev   -0.096*** (-3.147)   Count Trc Dev     0.021* (1.783)        BigN-MidN*Dev Ret 0.001 (0.123)     BigN-MidN*Dev Vol 0.029** (2.240)     BigN-MidN*Dev ZScore -0.001 (-0.016)     BigN-MidN*Dev Lev 0.061 (1.538)     BigN-MidN*Trc Dev Ret   0.027 (1.563)   BigN-MidN*Trc Dev Vol   0.048* (1.823)   BigN-MidN*Trc Dev ZScore   -0.073** (-2.484)   BigN-MidN*Trc Dev Lev   0.120*** (3.924)   BigN-MidN*Count Trc Dev     0.019* (1.645) 
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Table 15: Ln Fees with BigN-MidN Interactions (Cont.)   Panel A: Regression Output (1) (2) (3)  Continuous  Top Tercile Ind  Top Tercile Count  Variables t t t        Ln AT 0.379*** (37.604) 0.380*** (37.763) 0.379*** (37.631) Ln Rev 0.113*** (11.501) 0.115*** (11.869) 0.113*** (11.657) Curr -0.003 (-1.478) -0.002 (-0.827) -0.003 (-1.261) FCF -0.003 (-0.408) -0.003 (-0.374) -0.003 (-0.381) CF Vol -0.000*** (-4.231) -0.000*** (-4.130) -0.000*** (-4.187) Rev Vol 0.000* (1.667) 0.000 (1.107) 0.000 (1.495) Ln Seg 0.155*** (10.658) 0.155*** (10.739) 0.155*** (10.688) Foreign 0.252*** (15.227) 0.254*** (15.385) 0.255*** (15.391) Loss 0.153*** (12.975) 0.112*** (9.759) 0.136*** (11.834) GCO 0.104*** (3.657) 0.119*** (4.226) 0.111*** (3.947) Busy 0.079*** (4.961) 0.078*** (4.953) 0.079*** (4.983) BigN-MidN 0.453*** (20.032) 0.434*** (14.721) 0.438*** (14.934) Merge 0.024** (2.015) 0.031*** (2.596) 0.027** (2.245) Mat Weak 0.326*** (17.553) 0.325*** (17.475) 0.323*** (17.339) Ind Herf -0.590*** (-2.827) -0.597*** (-2.886) -0.582*** (-2.800) Au Herf -0.033 (-0.248) -0.031 (-0.231) -0.034 (-0.256) CLead 0.057*** (4.387) 0.057*** (4.429) 0.057*** (4.419) Short Ten -0.052*** (-4.439) -0.053*** (-4.550) -0.052*** (-4.475) Constant 9.773*** (65.569) 9.740*** (67.312) 9.748*** (66.381) 
       Observations 24,900 24,900 24,900 Adjusted R-squared 0.850 0.851 0.850 Industry FE/Year FE Yes/Yes Yes/Yes Yes/Yes  
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Table 15: Ln Fees with BigN-MidN Interactions (Cont.)  Panel B: Joint Tests       
       Variables         F p 




Table 16: Misstate with BigN-MidN Interactions Panel A: Regression Output (1) (2) (3) 
 Continuous  Top Tercile Ind  Top Tercile Count  Variables z z z               Ret -0.024 (-0.154) -0.111 (-1.570) -0.112* (-1.883) Vol 9.803* (1.942) 8.781*** (2.862) 8.951*** (3.078) Zscore -0.003 (-0.274) -0.005 (-0.442) -0.005 (-0.386) Lev 0.543*** (2.951) 0.537*** (3.147) 0.493*** (3.063) 
       Dev Ret -0.012 (-0.122)     Dev Vol -0.053 (-0.479)     Dev ZScore 0.124 (0.644)     Dev Lev 0.412* (1.914)     Trc Dev Ret   -0.045 (-0.277)   Trc Dev Vol   -0.103 (-0.465)   Trc Dev ZScore   0.287 (1.158)   Trc Dev Lev   0.233 (1.022)   Count Trc Dev     0.095 (0.974) BigN-MidN*Dev Ret -0.022 (-0.330)     BigN-MidN*Dev Vol 0.110 (1.240)     BigN-MidN*Dev ZScore -0.141 (-0.478)     BigN-MidN*Dev Lev -0.457** (-1.995)     BigN-MidN*Trc Dev Ret   0.153 (0.943)   BigN-MidN*Trc Dev Vol   0.242 (1.017)   BigN-MidN*Trc Dev ZScore   -0.218 (-0.837)   BigN-MidN*Trc Dev Lev   -0.245 (-1.010)   BigN-MidN*Count Trc Dev     -0.017 (-0.174)        
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Table 16: Misstate with BigN-MidN Interactions (Cont.)  Panel A: Regression Output (1) (2) (3) 
 Continuous  Top Tercile Ind  Top Tercile Count  Variables z z z        Ln AT 0.158** (2.072) 0.160** (2.096) 0.155** (2.043) Ln Rev -0.052 (-0.734) -0.050 (-0.715) -0.053 (-0.759) Curr 0.000 (0.006) 0.003 (0.198) 0.002 (0.127) FCF -0.081* (-1.728) -0.081* (-1.791) -0.081* (-1.792) CF Vol -0.000 (-0.856) -0.000 (-0.860) -0.000 (-0.845) Rev Vol -0.000 (-0.869) -0.000 (-0.901) -0.000 (-0.915) Ln Seg 0.232** (2.077) 0.233** (2.076) 0.235** (2.095) Foreign -0.217* (-1.939) -0.216* (-1.926) -0.215* (-1.920) Loss 0.099 (0.994) 0.035 (0.338) 0.049 (0.500) GCO -1.173*** (-4.232) -1.087*** (-4.192) -1.083*** (-4.214) Busy -0.201* (-1.839) -0.202* (-1.853) -0.203* (-1.855) BigN-MidN -0.231 (-1.285) -0.167 (-0.637) -0.108 (-0.416) Merge 0.034 (0.327) 0.041 (0.395) 0.037 (0.352) Mat Weak 0.790*** (8.183) 0.786*** (8.126) 0.786*** (8.149) Ind Herf 0.067 (0.031) 0.196 (0.092) 0.228 (0.107) Au Herf -1.407 (-0.976) -1.478 (-1.019) -1.483 (-1.022) CLead 0.029 (0.286) 0.033 (0.324) 0.030 (0.297) Short Ten -0.128 (-1.368) -0.129 (-1.376) -0.130 (-1.380) Constant -2.724** (-2.060) -2.901** (-2.180) -2.900** (-2.201) 
       Observations 24,900 24,900 24,900 Pseudo R-squared 0.850 0.851 0.850 Area under ROC 0.756 0.756 0.755 Industry FE/Year FE Yes/Yes Yes/Yes Yes/Yes 
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Table 16: Misstate with BigN-MidN Interactions (Cont.)    Panel B: Joint Tests       
       Variables         χ2 p 




Table 17: Ln Fees with NLead Interactions Panel A: Regression Output (1) (2) (3) 
 Continuous  Top Tercile Ind  Top Tercile Count  Variables t t t               Ret 0.013 (1.120) 0.004 (0.578) -0.011* (-1.837) Vol -0.053 (-0.106) -0.999*** (-2.821) -1.083*** (-3.243) Zscore 0.023*** (10.197) 0.021*** (10.391) 0.023*** (10.596) Lev 0.054* (1.854) 0.054* (1.792) 0.026 (0.977) 
       Dev Ret -0.007 (-0.966)     Dev Vol -0.014 (-1.273)     Dev ZScore 0.037* (1.929)     Dev Lev 0.001 (0.060)     Trc Dev Ret   -0.009 (-0.936)   Trc Dev Vol   0.008 (0.654)   Trc Dev ZScore   0.104*** (6.588)   Trc Dev Lev   -0.026* (-1.751)   Count Trc Dev     0.021*** (3.428) NLead*Dev Ret -0.006 (-0.862)     NLead*Dev Vol 0.029* (1.931)     NLead*Dev ZScore 0.089** (2.508)     NLead*Dev Lev 0.050* (1.723)     NLead*Trc Dev Ret   0.001 (0.080)   NLead*Trc Dev Vol   0.069*** (2.888)   NLead*Trc Dev ZScore   -0.006 (-0.215)   NLead*Trc Dev Lev   0.094*** (3.895)   NLead*Count Trc Dev     0.036*** (3.449)        
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Table 17: Ln Fees with NLead Interactions (Cont.) Panel A: Regression Output (1) (2) (3) 
 Continuous  Top Tercile Ind  Top Tercile Count  Variables t t t        Ln AT 0.368*** (34.634) 0.372*** (35.078) 0.370*** (34.824) Ln Rev 0.142*** (13.912) 0.143*** (14.221) 0.142*** (14.036) Curr -0.001 (-0.336) 0.001 (0.245) -0.000 (-0.219) FCF 0.003 (0.420) 0.002 (0.301) 0.003 (0.391) CF Vol -0.000*** (-3.603) -0.000*** (-3.586) -0.000*** (-3.552) Rev Vol 0.000 (0.432) -0.000 (-0.332) 0.000 (0.188) Ln Seg 0.102*** (6.847) 0.103*** (6.966) 0.102*** (6.879) Foreign 0.238*** (14.371) 0.239*** (14.434) 0.240*** (14.490) Loss 0.161*** (13.540) 0.123*** (10.585) 0.148*** (12.756) GCO 0.096*** (3.265) 0.109*** (3.730) 0.104*** (3.544) Busy 0.039** (2.384) 0.036** (2.195) 0.037** (2.288) BigN 0.329*** (16.407) 0.330*** (16.553) 0.329*** (16.526) Merge 0.048*** (3.849) 0.054*** (4.365) 0.050*** (4.049) Mat Weak 0.332*** (17.507) 0.330*** (17.471) 0.329*** (17.314) Ind Herf -0.692*** (-3.384) -0.702*** (-3.445) -0.676*** (-3.316) Au Herf -0.062 (-0.466) -0.080 (-0.603) -0.079 (-0.599) NLead 0.064*** (4.295) 0.014 (0.703) 0.022 (1.123) Short Ten -0.045*** (-3.852) -0.046*** (-3.944) -0.046*** (-3.926) Constant 9.974*** (67.736) 9.948*** (69.600) 9.969*** (69.323) 
       Observations 24,900 24,900 24,900 Adjusted R-squared 0.834 0.835 0.834 Industry FE/Year FE Yes/Yes Yes/Yes Yes/Yes  
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Table 17: Ln Fees with NLead Interactions (Cont.) Panel B: Joint Tests       
       Variables         F p 




Table 18: Misstate with NLead Interactions Panel A: Regression Output (1) (2) (3) 
 Continuous  Top Tercile Ind  Top Tercile Count  Variables z z z               Ret 0.045 (0.300) -0.110* (-1.667) -0.108* (-1.898) Vol 9.009* (1.841) 8.952*** (3.067) 9.176*** (3.296) Zscore -0.003 (-0.239) -0.004 (-0.356) -0.003 (-0.303) Lev 0.554*** (3.067) 0.551*** (3.260) 0.525*** (3.326) 
       Dev Ret -0.086 (-1.042)     Dev Vol 0.016 (0.180)     Dev ZScore 0.080 (0.522)     Dev Lev 0.091 (0.736)     Trc Dev Ret   0.009 (0.097)   Trc Dev Vol   0.026 (0.235)   Trc Dev ZScore   0.167 (1.348)   Trc Dev Lev   0.010 (0.093)   Count Trc Dev     0.059 (1.158) NLead*Dev Ret 0.064 (0.890)     NLead*Dev Vol 0.132 (1.241)     NLead*Dev ZScore -0.212 (-0.520)     NLead*Dev Lev -0.115 (-0.468)     NLead*Trc Dev Ret   0.253 (1.548)   NLead*Trc Dev Vol   0.253 (1.230)   NLead*Trc Dev ZScore   -0.373* (-1.768)   NLead*Trc Dev Lev   0.130 (0.682)   NLead*Count Trc Dev     0.048 (0.628)        
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Table 18: Misstate with NLead Interactions (Cont.) Panel A: Regression Output (1) (2) (3) 
 Continuous  Top Tercile Ind  Top Tercile Count  Variables z z z        Ln AT 0.154** (2.086) 0.154** (2.094) 0.154** (2.085) Ln Rev -0.035 (-0.515) -0.034 (-0.505) -0.035 (-0.525) Curr 0.004 (0.229) 0.006 (0.359) 0.006 (0.351) FCF -0.072 (-1.582) -0.076* (-1.706) -0.073 (-1.632) CF Vol -0.000 (-1.056) -0.000 (-1.048) -0.000 (-1.055) Rev Vol -0.000 (-1.092) -0.000 (-1.121) -0.000 (-1.132) Ln Seg 0.136 (1.273) 0.133 (1.244) 0.136 (1.265) Foreign -0.139 (-1.318) -0.141 (-1.336) -0.136 (-1.288) Loss 0.084 (0.871) 0.033 (0.324) 0.039 (0.408) GCO -0.976*** (-3.928) -0.948*** (-3.862) -0.946*** (-3.867) Busy -0.208* (-1.938) -0.217** (-2.017) -0.214** (-1.993) BigN -0.301** (-2.362) -0.282** (-2.210) -0.284** (-2.246) Merge 0.066 (0.654) 0.074 (0.726) 0.072 (0.702) Mat Weak 0.798*** (8.480) 0.795*** (8.448) 0.794*** (8.442) Ind Herf -0.296 (-0.140) -0.248 (-0.118) -0.149 (-0.071) Au Herf -1.327 (-0.937) -1.361 (-0.957) -1.369 (-0.957) NLead 0.272** (2.347) 0.178 (1.081) 0.212 (1.294) Short Ten -0.199** (-2.138) -0.198** (-2.112) -0.199** (-2.130) Constant -2.612** (-1.990) -2.715** (-2.080) -2.741** (-2.104) 
       Observations 24,900 24,900 24,900 Pseudo R-squared 0.106 0.106 0.106 Area under ROC 0.755 0.756 0.754 Industry FE/Year FE Yes/Yes Yes/Yes Yes/Yes 
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Table 18: Misstate with NLead Interactions (Cont.) Panel B: Joint Tests       
       Variables         χ2 p 
       Dev Ret + NLead*Dev Ret    0.057 0.811 Dev Vol + NLead*Dev Vol    1.432 0.231 Dev Zscore + NLead*Dev Zscore    0.100 0.752 Dev Lev + NLead*Dev Lev    0.010 0.922        Trc Dev Ret + NLead*Trc Dev Ret    3.062* 0.080 Trc Dev Vol + NLead*Trc Dev Vol    2.224 0.136 Trc Dev Zscore + NLead*Trc Dev Zscore    1.071 0.301 Trc Dev Lev + NLead*Trc Dev Lev    0.621 0.431        Count Trc Dev + NLead*Count Trc Dev    2.260 0.133               The dependent variable is Misstate. All variables are as defined in Appendix A. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. Industry fixed effects are at the three-digit NAICS level. Year fixed effects are included for the fiscal year of the company. The models are estimated using Logistic regression with robust standard errors clustered by company. ***,**, and * indicate two tailed significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively.  
 
